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ABSTRACT 
China’s economic reforms revealed the Chinese Communist Party’s search for a new 
basis for political legitimacy and authority.  The PRC’s contemporary political bargain is 
best characterized as a tenuous balance between economic modernization and political 
repression.  This dichotomous political bargain yields a fragile legitimacy, aspects of 
which activate to shape China’s Mekong River policies. 
This paper examines the impact of the CCP’s fragile legitimacy on two case 
studies involving China’s Mekong River economic interests, involving (1) hydropower 
dams and (2) counter-narcotics enforcement.  China’s hydroelectric pursuits on the 
Mekong are predominantly shaped by the regime’s economic growth mandate, concerns 
about domestic inequality, and demands to alleviate social costs arising from recent 
development.  China’s counter-narcotics efforts on the Mekong River are also tied to 
economic considerations, but increasingly reflect the Party’s efforts to enhance its 
nationalist and security credentials.  China’s Mekong River policies illustrate how the 
CCP’s domestic motivations deserve greater weight in explaining the perception of 
China’s increasing assertiveness. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B.  IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................1 
C.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................................3 
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 
1.  Domestic Political Economy Literature .............................................5 
2.  International Context ..........................................................................6 
E.  METHODS AND SOURCES ..........................................................................9 
F.  THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................10 
II.  CHINA’S RISE AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS ...................................................13 
A.  CHINA’S HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY ..................................................13 
B.  DOMESTIC POLITICAL ECONOMY ......................................................14 
1.  Evolving Growth Imperatives ...........................................................14 
2.  Inequality Concerns ...........................................................................16 
3.  Chinese Nationalism and Frustration Outlets .................................17 
4.  Security Imperative ...........................................................................18 
5.  Other Challenges, Despite Growth ...................................................19 
C.  FOREIGN FACTORS AND PRC–MEKONG RELATIONS ...................20 
1.  Changing Perceptions ........................................................................20 
2.  Increasing Competition, But Deferred Confrontation ...................21 
3.  Regional Institutional Architecture..................................................23 
D.  SUMMARY ....................................................................................................25 
III.  CASE STUDY I: CHINESE DAMS .........................................................................27 
A.  THE LANCANG CASCADE .......................................................................27 
B.  DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF DAM POLICY ...............................................28 
1.  National Economic Growth and Development Imperative ............28 
a.  PRC Economic Strategy..........................................................29 
b.  Domestic Interest Groups .......................................................30 
c.  Institutional Selection and Engagement ................................32 
2.  Addressing Yunnan Inequality .........................................................35 
a.  Economic Pathways ................................................................35 
b.  Political Pathways ...................................................................36 
3.  Environmental and Health Degradation .........................................38 
C.  DAMS SUMMARY .......................................................................................39 
IV.  CASE STUDY II: CHINESE COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY .....................41 
A.  HISTORICAL POLICY TRAJECTORY ...................................................41 
B.  DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF PRC COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY ..44 
1.  Nationalism .........................................................................................45 
a.  Domestic Outlets .....................................................................45 
b.  Rising Power Expectations .....................................................48 
2.  Security Imperative ...........................................................................49 
 viii
a.  New Challenges at the Mekong Frontier ...............................50 
b.  Security Competence ...............................................................53 
C.  COUNTER-NARCOTICS SUMMARY ......................................................55 
V.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS .......................................57 
A.  SUMMARY ....................................................................................................57 
B.  MEKONG CONCLUSIONS.........................................................................59 
1.  Diversity of Mekong Motivations .....................................................59 
2.  Consistent with Trends ......................................................................60 
3.  Across the Legality Spectrum: Policy Effectiveness Prioritized ....62 
C.  BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S MEKONG POLICIES ............63 
1.  Not So Soft and Charming ................................................................63 
2.  The Tyranny of Fragile Legitimacy .................................................64 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................67 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................77 
 
 ix
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACCORD ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to 
Dangerous Drugs 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
AMBDC ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
ATS amphetamine-type stimulants 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
EEZ exclusive economic zone 
FDI foreign direct investment 
GAC General Administration of Customs (PRC) 
GDP gross domestic product 
GMS Greater Mekong Subregion 
HDI human development indicators 
MRC Mekong River Commission 
MOU memoranda of understanding 
MPS Ministry of Public Security (PRC) 
MWR Ministry of Water Resources (PRC) 
NSC new security concept 
NNCC National Narcotics Control Commission (PRC) 
PLA People’s Liberation Army 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
SFDA State Food and Drug Administration (PRC) 
SOE state-owned enterprise 
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 
UN United Nations 








A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) emergence as a global power drives 
many questions about the motivations and trajectories of Chinese policies.  Wide-ranging 
analyses of the effects of China’s rise typically consider superpower relations, militarized 
border disputes, and competing maritime claims.  China’s behavior in economic spheres, 
however, offers another essential lens to help characterize the impacts of the PRC’s 
power for two reasons.  First, economic growth and development are essential for the 
material gains that fuel China’s influence.  Second, China’s economic interests are 
outgrowths of domestic political mandates arising from the Chinese Communist Party’s 
(CCP) fragile legitimacy.   
The Mekong River—called the Lancang Jiang along its initial stretch through 
Chinese territory—is a developing economic artery where China’s domestic political 
imperatives increasingly encounter diverse foreign interests.  The Mekong offers a unique 
window on China’s policies because economic interests transit the river’s course across 
multiple borders, testing regional sensitivities about national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.  This thesis will draw on two recent developments in Mekong economic 
activity—the construction of Chinese hydroelectric dams and counter-narcotics 
trafficking efforts—to identify how domestic political concerns shape China’s 
interactions with Southeast Asia.  How does the Chinese Communist Party’s fragile 
legitimacy at home affect China’s policies along the Mekong River?   
B. IMPORTANCE  
A careful investigation of PRC policies on the Mekong River will contribute to a 
broader understanding of China’s emergence as a global power while shedding light on a 
sub-region that is sometimes overshadowed by issues surrounding superpower 
competition between the United States and China, East Asian rivalries for influence in the 
sub-region, or South China Sea maritime disputes. 
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Though the fireworks of potential conflict might be greater elsewhere, China’s 
policies on the Mekong deserve scrutiny because China’s riparian neighbors suffer from 
tenuous security conditions at the state and human level.  Cooperation could help address 
existing deficiencies, but conflict between any of the Mekong states—with or without 
China—would exacerbate regional security deficiencies, displace locals, and could prove 
deadly for millions.  China’s policies stand juxtaposed against the recent U.S. Lower 
Mekong Initiative that seeks to reinforce cooperation across a range of river basin issues.  
Cronin and Hamlin outline, for instance, the “incalculable impact on human and food 
security and livelihoods in the whole Mekong Basin” that could be triggered by China’s 
Mekong dams.1  That is, China’s economic policies may purposely or inadvertently 
impose disproportionately negative externalities on the economically and politically weak 
states downriver, thereby applying pressure on an already-fragile security environment.  
A second aspect of China’s actions on the Mekong River involves the question of 
whether the overwhelming power disparity between China and its southern neighbors 
fosters conflict or cooperation in the sub-region.  As Goh details, “China is the uppermost 
riparian state and the most politically powerful country in the basin, with the fastest 
economic growth rates.  Beijing could well push forward with its ambitious plans… to 
the detriment of its downstream neighbors.”2  The PRC’s domestic motivations for 
policies that impact its weak Mekong neighbors—posing comparatively little military 
threat—may inform predictions of whether larger regional antagonisms will develop or 
heal as China’s power grows.  Stated another way, the domestic impulses of China’s 
Mekong behavior can portend future foreign policies when China, if it continues on the 
current trajectory, holds a clearer advantage in state power.  Other states will observe 
how Mekong tensions are resolved to inform their own inclination towards or against a 
future, stronger China. 
                                                 
1 Richard Cronin and Timothy Hamlin, Mekong Tipping Point: Hydropower Dams, Human Security 
and Regional Stability (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2010), 30. 
2 Evelyn Goh, “China in the Mekong River Basin: The Regional Security Implications of Resource 
Development on the Lancang Jiang,” (working paper no.69, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 
Singapore, July 2004), 4. 
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It is widely accepted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime must 
generate strong economic growth to earn legitimacy for its authoritarian rule.  However, 
as China rises, its domestic goals dictate imperatives abroad that shape China’s 
connection to the region.  Summers, for example, explores “the dominance of economic 
motivations in China’s engagement with the region.”3  With increasing globalization, 
Chinese industrial and commercial expansion will encounter new challenges—such as 
threats to trade routes by trans-national criminal organizations—that will frame China’s 
interactions with neighboring states.  The extent to which China elevates its domestic 
imperatives over regional concerns—especially in light of the CCP’s legitimacy 
requirements—will inform a broader understanding about how China’s pursuit of its 
expanding economic interests will shape the region.  Or, perhaps as instructive, this 
analysis will reveal lessons about how China’s relationships develop when domestic 
economic interests align with those of the other states. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The first main challenge in analyzing China’s policies involves the difficulty in 
drawing lasting conclusions in a rapidly evolving policy environment.  China is one of 
the fastest changing states in history, and generalizations from 10 years ago often fail to 
reflect accurately China’s contemporary capabilities, limitations, and constraints.  A 2004 
evaluation of China’s military modernization drove one leading scholar to list examples 
of China’s restraint that, paradoxically, largely predicted ensuing developments: 
The PLA does not seem to have made much progress in enhancing its 
power projection capabilities, nor do these seem to be a priority.  No 
aircraft carrier battle groups are being constructed; few destroyers capable 
of operating in the open ocean have been built; no military bases are being 
acquired abroad; training over water or far from China’s shores is 
minimal; no long-range bombers are being manufactured; and no airborne 
command and control aircraft have been deployed…4 
                                                 
3 Tim Summers, “China and the Mekong Region,” China Perspectives, (2008), accessed 27 May 2013, 
77, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/4083. 
4 David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, 
no. 3 (Winter 2004/05): 85–86. The analysis of Shambaugh’s writing builds on the author’s “reaction 
paper” from August 2012 that was submitted for Naazneen Barma’s NS3645 class at Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
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Thus, even leading experts struggle to provide enduring generalizations about 
China’s behavior because its instruments of power are changing so rapidly.  Current 
characterizations of Chinese actions might prove less applicable in the long-term as the 
nature of China’s power develops. 
A second problem in analyzing the PRC’s policies stems from limited 
transparency in the regime’s authoritarian decision-making and policy formulation 
processes.  It is difficult to determine cause-and-effect links in a state where decisions are 
often shielded from public discourse and official pronouncements aim to ensure regime 
survival rather than policy effectiveness.  As a result, downriver Mekong states struggle 
to decipher Chinese policy intentions when faced with complicated river management 
issues that the CCP would rather not address.5  Issues surrounding transparency and 
cause-effect links are exacerbated by the interplay of non-traditional security threats and 
non-state actors because policy formulation and execution may employ less formal 
avenues than overt diplomacy.   
The most compelling hypothesis for describing the China’s actions on the 
Mekong will likely derive from the distribution of political and economic benefits.  In 
cases where China maximizes gains for domestic actors—Party constituents or regime 
elites—to the detriment of downstream neighbors, Mekong relations will trend towards 
conflict.  However, when China acts to provide public goods or generates positive 
externalities for the Lower Mekong states, cooperation is more likely.  The ability of 
China’s rising economic tide to lift its downstream neighbors can help forgive sins in 
other areas and will weigh heavily on Mekong relations.  This paper explores the degree 
to which unique aspects of the CCP’s fragile legitimacy demand influence in Mekong 
policy formulation over the concerns of regional neighbors. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An analysis of China’s Mekong policies builds on existing literature on China’s 
domestic political economy and the international context for those policies.  This thesis 
 
                                                 
5 Goh, “China in the Mekong River Basin,” 6–8.  
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will use these domestic and international frameworks to order an empirical investigation 
of two cases of Mekong economic activity: the construction of Chinese hydroelectric 
dams and counter-narcotics enforcement on the Mekong River. 
1. Domestic Political Economy Literature 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory on the political economy of developing states 
argues that political and economic institutions must work in concert to deliver long-term 
development and modernization for citizens.  The CCP, however, oversees extractive 
political institutions that leverage inclusive economic growth to reinforce the regime’s 
legitimacy.6  The instability inherent in mixing extractive and inclusive institutions belies 
weaknesses in the regime’s political authority, and prompts an intense policy focus on 
ways to reinforce the Party’s governing legitimacy. 
A number of scholars identify the theoretical foundations for aspects of political 
legitimacy in developing states like China.  Bates argues that rulers must reorient societal 
violence to establish institutions where economic production is advantaged.7  Olson 
posits that a consequence of the state’s political extraction—governing elites acting as a 
“stationary bandit”—is that leaders develop an “encompassing interest” in providing 
security against “roving bandits” that would disrupt economic activity.8  Citizens 
generally only tolerate stationary bandits—like the CCP—that successfully provide 
security.  Amartya Sen considers variations in development outcomes, urging for broader 
development goals that prioritize social welfare and liberty from imposed costs alongside 
economic growth.  Sen views development as, “a process of expanding the real freedoms 
that people enjoy,” but China’s record suffers because the CCP’s authoritarian rule 
perpetuates “unfreedoms.”9 
                                                 
6 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, Prosperity, and 
Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 
7 Robert Bates, Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development, 2nd ed. (New York: 
WW Norton, 2010), 9–10. 
8 Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political Science Review 87 
no. 3 (1993): 567. 
9 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 3. 
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Building on theory, other scholars examine the practical realities of China’s 
contemporary political economy.  With a greater focus on politics, Susan Shirk details 
how the PRC’s domestic politics and the CCP’s political insecurity offer distractions and 
constraints on China’s rise to great power status.10  Shambaugh, Jakobson, and Mingjiang 
Li represent a body of authors who describe the PRC’s policy output as a result of intense 
internal political competition by interest groups with different visions of China’s national 
identity.11  On the economic front, Barry Naughton and Gregory Chow offer 
comprehensive analyses of China’s market reforms and modern economic challenges.12  
Lau, Qian, and Roland examine how the CCP avoided alienating its historic constituents 
by enacting “reform without losers,” incremental moves toward a market economy that 
sustained legacy political support through state-owned enterprises.13 
2. International Context 
From a global perspective, two factions address the question of China’s rise: 
hawkish analysts warn that conflict is likely as China’s power grows, while a more 
optimistic group envisions a peaceful, cooperative, and interdependent future.  The 
optimistic school’s main tenets are evident in China’s diplomatic language and regime 
propaganda.  Zheng Bijian, for example, argues that China’s “development path to a 
peaceful rise,” will deliver the fruits of modernization to its citizens but “transcend” the 
thorny, power-grabbing issues that typically affect rising powers.14   
Other scholars take a more nuanced view while generally agreeing on China’s 
peaceful trajectory.  Robert Ross, for instance, illustrates how China’s military still 
                                                 
10 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
11 David Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (16 
December 2010); Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China” (SIPRI policy 
paper no. 26, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, 2010); and, Mingjiang Li, 
“Local Liberalism: China’s Provincial Approaches to Relations with Southeast Asia,” Journal of 
Contemporary China, 22 (26 September 2013). 
12 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007); 
and, Gregory C. Chow, China’s Economic Transformation, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007). 
13 Lawrence J. Lau, Yingyi Qian, and Gerard Roland, “Reform Without Losers: An Interpretation of 
China’s Dual-Track Approach to Transition,” Journal of Political Economy 108, no. 1 (February 2000). 
14 Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 
(September–October 2005), 18–24.  
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compares poorly to U.S. power projection forces: “though China’s capabilities are 
increasing, in no way do they challenge US supremacy” so the PRC will avoid a 
devastating conflict.15  David Kang proposes that conventional theories might prove 
insufficient for analyzing China’s rise due to its unique cultural and historical 
experiences.  He cites evidence of bandwagoning—rather than balancing—in concluding 
“that China is likely to act within bounds acceptable to other Asian nations.”16   
Recent tensions in the East and South China Seas, however, cast a shadow over 
optimistic predictions and press the hawkish camp to project a more dangerous world.17  
One prominent scholar of this view, Aaron Friedberg, raises alarm over China’s 
modernization that targets the underpinnings of the U.S. security environment in Asia.  
The PRC’s challenge is based on calculations about obstacles that endanger its 
upswing—such as an independence push from Taiwan, Japanese aggression, or U.S. 
interventionism—and drive PLA funding, doctrine, and system acquisitions.18  Friedberg 
concludes that China identifies the United States as a “strategic competitor” for influence 
in Asia and is racing for advantage over likely flashpoints.19  A preponderance of the 
evidence of Chinese aggression, however, is drawn from clashes with larger, maritime 
states. 
More specific explorations of Southeast Asia regionalism view China relations 
from diplomatic, institutional, and non-traditional security perspectives.  In the 
diplomatic realm, Chinese governmental relations with Southeast Asia states provoke a 
wide range of characterizations.  Joseph Nye builds on his work with Robert Keohane to 
cite evidence of growing “soft power” in China’s interactions with its neighbors.20  
                                                 
15 Aaron Friedberg and Robert Ross, “Here Be Dragons—Is China a Military Threat?” The National 
Interest, no. 103 (September–October 2009): 26. 
16 David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International 
Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003), 57–58, 82.  
17 Ian Storey, “China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia: Less Charm, More Offensive,” China Brief 10, no. 
25 (17 December 2010): 4–7. 
18 Friedberg and Ross, “Here Be Dragons,” 19–20. 
19 Ibid., 24. 
20 Joseph S. Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power,” Wall Street Journal Asia, 29 December 2005, 
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/1499/rise_of_chinas_soft_power.html. 
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Joshua Kurlantzick’s account of China’s “charm offensive” details robust soft power 
efforts to advertise its “benign presence” and assuage the concerns of its neighbors.21  At 
the other end of the spectrum, John Lee cites the PRC’s fumbles that alienate its target 
audience: “Beijing has seemingly changed from pursuing ‘smile diplomacy’ to ham-
fisted provocateur…[by promoting] ‘win-win’ relationships to an increasingly skeptical 
region.”22  Providing more detailed scrutiny, Alex Liebman questions the emergence of a 
“proto-Chinese sphere of influence” by dissecting specific aspects of Chinese behavior to 
determine the sincerity of cooperation rhetoric.23 
Analyses of Southeast Asian and sub-regional institutions describe the 
multilateral architecture that seeks to facilitate engagement with China.  Clearly, ASEAN 
and its focused branches provide an overarching structure but alternative associations 
deserve exploration.  Felix Chang provides an excellent summary of “Regional 
Cooperative Initiatives” that “set the conditions for a more stable region” and provide an 
institutional context for the U.S. Lower Mekong Initiative’s introduction.24  Evelyn Goh 
cites a “growing China-centered regionalism in Southeast Asia” in exploring whether 
Mekong institutions can mitigate power imbalances to “overcome the competitive, and 
sometimes zero-sum, elements of national development goals.”25  Goh contrasts the 
relative experiences of the Mekong River Commission (MRC)—China is not a 
member—against the Asian Development Bank’s Greater Mekong Subregion Economic 
Cooperation Program (GMS)—China is an active participant—to glean probable avenues 
(economic development projects) of cooperation.26 
                                                 
21 Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia,” Current History: A Journal of 
Contemporary World Affairs 105, no. 692 (September 2006): 270. 
22 John Lee, “The End of Smile Diplomacy?” 23 September 2010, The National Interest, accessed 01 
June 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-end-smile-diplomacy-4122. 
23 Alex Liebman, “Trickle-down Hegemony? China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ and Dam Building on the 
Mekong.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (August 2005): 284–286. 
24 Felix K. Chang, “The Lower Mekong Initiative and U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia: Energy, 
Environment, and Power,” Orbis 57, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 293–294, 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438713000069. 
25 Evelyn Goh, Developing the Mekong: Regionalism and Regional Security in China-Southeast Asian 
Relations (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), 7, 23.  
26 Goh, “China in the Mekong River Basin,” 8.  
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A final aspect of China’s interaction with Southeast Asia embodies security 
concerns.  Existing literature generally breaks Mekong security considerations into two 
spheres that parallel the case studies in this thesis: state and human insecurity arising 
from resource scarcity or competition (river dams); and, the trans-boundary security 
threats exacerbated by globalization (narcotics trafficking).  Regarding scarce resources, 
Christopher Baker employs Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” scholarship to 
demonstrate how competing hydro-development initiatives—aggravated by a “prisoner’s 
dilemma” development incentive—could actually yield greater regional insecurity fueled 
by “severe food shortages, destruction of livelihoods, and large irregular movements of 
people.”27  Other scholars document the questionable role that Chinese development aid 
programs play in advancing China’s resource interests while sowing future instability—
“labour abuses, geopolitical backlashes, livelihood disruptions, social unrest, ecological 
perturbations, economic dependence and biodiversity losses”—in Mekong states.28 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will employ a comparative case study approach to analyze two 
examples of China’s regional economic behavior from diametric ends of the economic 
legality spectrum.  This method will help glean broader generalizations about the causal 
relationship underpinning China’s interaction with other states at its expanding frontiers.  
Dam building on the Mekong embodies massive, domestic, state-orchestrated, legal 
development of a natural resource that aids China’s national economic schemes.  The 
drug trade poses a non-traditional threat fueled by illegal, small-scale entrepreneurs who 
operate outside of conventional state purview and regulation.  Counter-narcotic efforts 
must also contend with irregular firm behavior—bribery, money laundering, black 
marketeering—in asserting state jurisdiction and power to limit or regulate the drug trade.   
                                                 
27 Christopher Baker, “Dams, Power, and Security in the Mekong: A Non-traditional Security 
Assessment of Hydro-development in the Mekong River Basin,” NTS-Asia Research Paper No. 8 
(Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, 2012), ii, 18. 
28 Sigfrido Burgos Caceres and Sophal Ear, The Hungry Dragon: How China’s Resource Quest is 
Reshaping the World (New York: Routledge, 2012), 108–113. 
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Taken together, Chinese dam building and counter-drug enforcement efforts will deliver 
a well-rounded survey of China’s behavior spanning legal and illegal economic activities 
affecting neighboring states. 
The Mekong serves as “a natural ecological unit that…could integrate southern 
China and the Southeast Asia mainland.”29  For this study, the Mekong also provides the 
geographic context to compare two different realms of economic activity and places 
regional bounds on the pressures of globalizing forces.  At once, the Mekong serves as a 
vehicle to analyze the linear, downstream effects of China’s hydropower policies while, 
simultaneously, allowing the research to meander across state boundaries like a narcotics 
smuggler.  The result will be a cross-cutting study of the way China interacts with other 
Mekong states. 
This study requires imposition of a temporal limit that reflects current events in a 
fast-changing region.  The year 1998 is a suitable starting point for analysis due to the 
confluence of three factors that denoted a broader integration and increased discussion of 
a rising China: (1) China’s regional leadership role appeared stronger following the 
1997–1998 Asian financial crisis; (2) Myanmar became the final member of ASEAN in 
July 1997, thereby creating an institutional body composed of all 10 Southeast Asian 
states; and (3) ASEAN-China engagement accelerated following the 1997 construction of 
the ASEAN Plus Three dialogue. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will feature five chapters.  Chapter I will serve as an introduction to 
highlight the importance and significance of China-Mekong relations, describe the 
relevance and themes of the case studies, and to outline the structure of the remaining 
chapters. 
Chapter II will briefly summarize China’s rise and provide the domestic and 
foreign context for examining the PRC’s Mekong policies.  China’s current domestic 
political bargain is embodied by the unstable balance between economic modernization 
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and authoritarian repression.  After Mao Zedong’s death and numerous communist policy 
failures, the CCP began ongoing attempts to revive its governing legitimacy around 
alternative domestic pathways, instead of failed communist ideology.  Additionally, the 
second chapter will outline contemporary trends in regional relations that frame reactions 
to the PRC’s actions.   
Chapter III will present a case study of China’s hydropower development along 
the Mekong River inside Chinese territory.  The regime’s economic growth mandate, 
requirement to resolve regional and ethnic inequality, and search for alternative 
development pathways that minimize the social costs imposed on Chinese citizens 
emerge as the strongest domestic shapers of the PRC’s Mekong hydropower behavior.  
Correspondingly, despite its downstream implications, China’s Mekong dam building 
arises almost entirely from an internal policy calculation, with little heed to external 
objections or demands. 
Chapter IV, on China’s counter-narcotics trafficking efforts, will characterize 
Chinese actions against illegal economic activities.  Historically, the CCP’s counter-
narcotics efforts were traced from the negative economic and social implications of drug 
use.  Since 2011, however, enflamed nationalism and new security imperatives have 
gained prominence in Chinese policy formulation resulting in more assertive and visible 
demonstrations of the CCP’s counter-narcotics effectiveness to domestic audiences. 
Chapter V will summarize lessons about Chinese action in both cases and 
highlights parallels or inconsistencies across the legality spectrum.  Central to this effort, 
the thesis attempts to illustrate how China’s Mekong behavior arises from a diverse pool 
of policy motivations traced to different aspects of the CCP’s legitimacy challenges.  
Also, the paper outlines the degree to which China’s contemporary Mekong policies 
confirm wider trends of increased assertiveness by China in the foreign policy arena.  
Ultimately, the analysis points to the how CCP’s hyper-prioritization of short-term 
contributions to regime stability and domestic legitimacy manifests as increased 
aggressiveness and inconsideration to foreign audiences. 
 12
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II. CHINA’S RISE AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS 
A. CHINA’S HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY 
In 1979, the initial year of economic reforms spearheaded by Deng Xiaoping, 
China’s GDP per capita was approximately $182.30  Thirty-three years later, in 2012, the 
same metric was over $6000 and growing at roughly eight percent annually.31  China’s 
rapid emergence as an upper-middle-income economy crowns a political bargain that 
offers a tenuous tradeoff between state-led growth and sociopolitical repression.32   
China’s contemporary, market-fueled boom found impetus in the wake of 
disastrous Chinese Communist Party (CCP) central planning and revolutionary ardor 
under Mao Zedong.33  The troubled legacy of Mao’s economic development and political 
consolidation schemes bequeathed a unique set of circumstances to the reform-minded 
Deng with political power cemented atop an effective administrative structure—CCP 
members exercise state capacity to enact policy in spite of contentious opposition.  More 
broadly, as Chow argues, there are four reasons why China “was ripe for reform” in the 
late 1970s: (1) the CCP had to reinvent itself to maintain political legitimacy; (2) the 
failures of central planners were growing more evident; (3) the success of market 
economies in East Asia offered reform models; and (4) Chinese citizens increasingly 
demanded growth and development.34 
The CCP’s lessons from Mao’s era combine with an updated, globalized growth 
calculus to inform modern political impulses.  From Deng’s reforms, the roots of China’s 
modern political economy flourished.  The CCP now points to its economic reforms and 
                                                 
30 This section contains material originally written for NS4053 coursework at NPS. 
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33 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 69–71. 
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ensuing rapid growth to justify a repressive political monopoly to its domestic audience.  
Similarly, economic growth has bankrolled the state’s capacity to influence foreign 
interactions.  Through two case studies, this paper will analyze China’s policies regarding 
Mekong economic activities to decipher trends towards cooperation or conflict arising 
from the CCP’s legitimacy challenges.  First, however, the broad political environment 
surrounding China’s Mekong policies will provide context for the case study analysis.   
B. DOMESTIC POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Viewed under Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s framework, the CCP 
oversees extractive political institutions that leverage inclusive economic growth to 
reinforce regime primacy.35  The tenuous contract that obliges China’s regime to deliver 
benefits to its citizens belies a systemic uneasiness about domestic outcomes and 
perceptions of the regime.  How China’s elites respond to domestic challenges will 
inform the analyses of case studies and illustrate the weight attributable to domestic 
forces in PRC-Mekong policy calculations. 
1. Evolving Growth Imperatives 
Since Deng’s initial reforms in the late-1970s, the CCP has conducted an iterative 
reform process to pursue advancing modernization targets.  The first, cautious reforms 
reversed Mao’s collectivist policies to enliven agricultural and basic industrial sectors.36  
Ensuing reforms belied a key political concern: the CCP wanted to avoid mass disruption 
of existing architecture because it buttressed regime legitimacy via side payments, 
employment, and social services.37  “Dual-track” production and pricing systems and 
gradual institutional experimentation helped provide insurance against disruptions and 
enabled the CCP to consolidate political control over all segments of production.38  Later 
                                                 
35 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and 
Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 
36 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 88–90. 
37 Lawrence J. Lau, Yingyi Qian, and Gerard Roland, “Reform Without Losers: An Interpretation of 
China’s Dual-Track Approach to Transition,” Journal of Political Economy 108, no. 1 (February 2000): 
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initiatives addressed China’s emergence as a regulatory state by implementing new fiscal 
and tax structures, re-designed financial and monetary policy tools, reforms to state-
owned enterprise governance, and technocrats trained as professional economists.39 
Nearing the new millennium, CCP economic growth targets prompted a 
politically riskier batch of reforms—what Barry Naughton calls “reform with losers”—
where inefficient components of the old, state-controlled architecture were discarded.40  
In a wider search for economic returns, China also enacted a “Going Out” strategy that 
urges Chinese investment abroad and emboldens firms to compete—and, therefore, take 
on elevated risk—in globalized markets and trade.  These later reforms—that risk 
creating “losers” from the CCP’s constituency—underscore the regime’s prioritization of 
economic growth in spite of headwinds to marginal returns.  Moreover, the “Going Out” 
policy increasingly exposes Chinese to risks abroad and prompts two burning questions 
for China’s policy-makers: (1) how should the PRC protect its foreign interests when 
threatened?; and (2) will China’s pursuit of resources trigger competition or conflict?41 
The iterations of PRC economic reforms highlight political calculations about 
CCP legitimacy.  In each successive batch of reforms, the CCP accepts the risk of 
alienating relatively small segments of the population to engender larger returns for the 
majority that will buttress regime support.  The “Going Out” strategy aims for greater 
returns but assumes greater risks of increased competition and, in some cases, violent 
hostility abroad.  This calculation applies to China’s Mekong River policies, and this 
paper will underscore the link between state-led Mekong River activities and the CCP’s 
growth-legitimacy bargain. 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 100–105. 
40 Ibid., 106–107. 
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2. Inequality Concerns 
China’s development experience underscores how economic growth can change 
outcomes: 600 million people arose from destitution since Deng’s initial reforms.42  
Quality-of-life indicators, like the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals, are 
also improving.43  Yet China’s development has also produced vast inequality—officially 
captured by a Gini coefficient of 0.474 for 2012, but widely suspected to be greater—that 
weighs on its Mekong River policies.44   
Failure to fashion an economy with more equitable benefits and economic 
inclusiveness risks schisms along regional or ethnic lines.  The explosion of 
manufacturing and industrial activity in eastern, coastal provinces has fueled an urban 
boom that has outpaced rural incomes.  Citizens in “China’s richest areas (Shanghai, 
Beijing, Zhejiang province, Guangdong province, and Fujian province) make twice as 
much as residents of the five poorest areas.”45  In contrast, Yunnan Province in the west, 
home to the headwaters of the Mekong, has realized lower average growth rates and 
ranked near the bottom in per capita GDP since 1990.46 
Divergences in ethnic outcomes aggravate regional inequality.  Nationwide, non-
Han ethnic minorities comprise only 8.5 percent of the population.47  In Yunnan, home to 
the “highest number of ethnic groups among all provinces and autonomous regions in 
China,” almost 40 percent of residents are minorities.48  Taken together, regional and 
                                                 
42 Timothy Besley, “Poor Choices: Poverty from the Ground Level,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 
(January/February 2012): 165. 
43 World Bank, China Country Partnership Strategy for the Period FY13-FY16, 11 November 2012, 
accessed 22 September 2013, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/11/16946577/china-
country-partnership-strategy-period-fy13-fy16, 2. 
44 “Inequality: Gini Out of the Bottle,” The Economist, 26 January 2013, 
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45 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 31. 
46 C. Cindy Fan and Mingjie Sun, “Regional Inequality in China, 1978–2006,” Eurasian Geography 
and Economics 49, no. 1 (2008): 10; data summary from People’s Republic of China National Bureau of 
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47 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, modified 22 August 2013, 
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 17
ethnic inequality exposes cracks in the economic inclusiveness foundations of the 
regime’s political bargain.  A leading Chinese economist acknowledges the danger: “The 
widening wealth gap caused as cities and coastal areas race ahead of the hinterland could 
spark social unrest and undermine the government’s authority over the country’s 1.3 
billion people.”49  To the CCP’s credit, the Party appears to recognize how widening 
wealth disparities could undermine regime legitimacy and is targeting programs to 
address rural areas, especially in Yunnan Province.50 
3. Chinese Nationalism and Frustration Outlets 
According to national myth, the CCP’s revolutionary prowess and ideological 
vigor reversed a “century of humiliation” characterized by repeated domination by 
foreign powers.  The historic bona fides of regime legitimacy endured until Communist 
ideology decayed as economic liberalization gained traction while the Soviet Union 
collapsed.  Pressed by the Tiananmen Square protests, the regime recommitted “to bind 
people to the Party through nationalism” as a new way to solidify CCP legitimacy and 
enforce domestic stability.51 
To distract attention from the politically extractive regime and reinforce its 
legitimacy along nationalist lines, the CCP boosts “patriotic education campaigns” 
through social institutions and propaganda outlets while elites increasingly appeal to 
nationalist sentiment in speeches and communiqués.52  Official propaganda bureaucracy, 
skewed information controls, and widespread internet adoption have corroborated to fuel 
a heightened saliency for foreign actions that disrespect or harm Chinese citizens.53   
The net result is the CCP endorses and sustains outsized, nationalist responses by 
domestic constituents that influence the character of foreign policymaking.  Two 
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implications for the Mekong region arise from elevated Chinese nationalism.  First, the 
CCP tends to encourage Chinese unity against foreign affronts or threats, especially when 
they obscure domestic frustrations, to the extent that domestic stability is not endangered.  
Second, the state’s ability to maintain absolute control over foreign policy is diminishing 
while its response tools are increasing.  Chinese nationalism now has a more direct link to 
instruments of foreign policy and state power.54 
4. Security Imperative 
Security shortfalls deteriorate the bargain between the PRC’s economically 
inclusive and politically extractive institutions.  Shared benefits diminish when citizens 
lack political avenues to address security concerns, or if a state is unable to provide for 
citizen security.  Mancur Olson summarizes the prices of political extraction in 
portraying the state as a “stationary bandit” with an “encompassing interest” in “peaceful 
order and other public goods that increase productivity.”55  Citizens generally only 
tolerate stationary bandits—like the CCP—that provide the security necessary to enable 
productive economic activities. 
Robert Bates underscores how effective regimes must engender conditions where 
security and economic growth are mutually reinforcing.  The essential role of those who 
“specialize in the use of violence”—political elites—is to optimize the use of violence 
and coercion to enable economic production.56  If regimes fail to employ state power in 
ways that protect commercial activity, political elites risk appearing incompetent and 
undermining the currents of economic growth required to satisfy political bargains.  
Neither outcome fosters regime legitimacy. 
As China opens, Chinese goods and citizens travel along trade arteries that require 
security.  The CCP’s ability to maintain security and respond to threats across an ever-
expanding sphere goes to the question of the regime’s legitimacy.  There is some 
evidence that PRC elites understand the new demands for security at home and abroad: 
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since 2008, the Chinese navy has conducted anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden to 
protect crucial energy trade routes.  PRC officials emphasize that “the government has a 
responsibility to protect” its citizens outside of China.57  The domestic implications of 
poor security conditions abroad affect how the PRC engages state and non-state actors 
along the Mekong River because threats undermine regime legitimacy on security and 
economic fronts. 
5. Other Challenges, Despite Growth   
The stellar economic growth record obscures some of the negative outcomes 
traced to CCP policies.  Amartya Sen postulates that development is “a process of 
expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy,” but China’s record suffers because the 
CCP’s political extraction institutionalizes “unfreedoms.”58  Chinese are subject to a 
variety of restrictions on liberty imposed directly or indirectly by the growth-at-all-costs 
regime.  The CCP’s lack of responsiveness to citizen welfare begets deplorable “missing 
women” phenomena, “re-education” labor camps, lagging human development indicators 
(HDI), pervasive environmental and health crises, and deteriorated links between 
individual choices and quality-of-life.59 
The dichotomy of China’s political bargain yields the mixed results.  The 
extractive characteristics of CCP authoritarianism obfuscate other, meaningful measures 
of development and deafen the regime to citizens’ concerns.  The manifestation of social 
ills to the Chinese citizen generates pressure on the regime in two ways: (1) the benefits 
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of economic growth must outweigh the domestic costs of externalities; and, (2) the CCP 
must try alternative methods of development that decrease negative externalities endured 
by Chinese citizens.  The Mekong River is an ecological and geographic avenue for 
policies that address both pressures and enhance the CCP’s stature within China. 
C. FOREIGN FACTORS AND PRC–MEKONG RELATIONS 
Mekong states are uncertain of China’s strategic intentions, the PRC’s methods of 
engagement, and whether cooperation can coexist alongside economic and resource 
competition.  This paper seeks to inform an understanding of China’s Mekong policies 
against the background of regional trends.  The international setting, therefore, adds 
perspective to the case studies that helps determine whether domestic pressures are 
stimulating conflict or cooperation along the Mekong. 
1. Changing Perceptions 
At the dawn of the new millennium, China attempted to reassure other states 
about its expanding economic influence and military modernization.  The PRC’s 
“peaceful rise” message stressed nonviolent economic development, a rejection of 
hegemonic pursuits, and “win-win” opportunities for cooperation.60  The New Security 
Concept (NSC) advocated “cooperative security, multilateral dialogue, confidence-
building measures, and peaceful resolution of international disputes” and seemed to align 
with other benign overtures to Southeast Asian countries.61 
As China steamed down its foreign policy track, analysts noted divergence from 
official rhetoric.  Avery Goldstein characterizes China’s “grand strategy” that fuses 
“great power partnerships” with “multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to mute threat 
perceptions” so as to persuade against impediments to China’s emergence as a great  
 
                                                 
60 Liebman, “Trickle-down Hegemony?” 282–283. 
61 Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia: Balancing or Bandwagoning?” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A 
Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 27, no. 2 (August 2005): 309. 
 21
power.62  Others note how “‘win-win’ arrangements are not really practical” on zero-sum 
issues, but remained hopeful that China might “become integral in providing regional 
public goods.”63 
Beginning around 2008, China’s neighbors observed more aggressive patterns in 
China’s relations.  PRC officials expanded the classification of Chinese “core interests,” 
snubbed U.S. leaders at international meetings, harassed foreign vessels in its exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), suspended shipments of rare earth metals to Japan, and made 
inflammatory moves and statements regarding territorial claims.  That “Chinese foreign 
policy has turned more confrontational”—even “overactive”—has not escaped notice.64  
Chinese foreign aid actively courts favor—perhaps for generous investment 
opportunities—but recent events have rekindled long-held regional fears of domination 
and heightened sovereignty concerns.65  In pursuing its policy goals, the PRC now 
encounters significantly more wariness by downstream Mekong states than it did 15 years 
ago. 
2. Increasing Competition, But Deferred Confrontation 
Increasing economic competition tied to resource scarcity, market access, and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) drives regional apprehension.  PRC-Mekong competition 
garners fewer headlines than disputes in the East or South China Seas, but there are 
reasons for concern over the competitive landscape.  Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy of the 
commons” stresses how single-state efforts to maximize economic returns from shared 
geography might result in resource depletion—arguably, competition for limited 
resources will make conflict more likely.66  Regional competition is also evident in 
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access to developing markets.  China and Southeast Asian states contend for commercial 
interests across the region.  The PRC, for example, recently bartered “sizeable assistance 
packages and tariff exemptions” for “90-year leases on vast stretches of land along” 
evolving economic corridors.67  Similarly, over 180 Yunnan-based agricultural 
enterprises—encouraged by PRC tax breaks and subsidies—have invested in Myanmar 
and Laos to grow crops that “are then exported to Yunnan for further processing.”68  FDI 
is a third arena for economic rivalry.  Though analysts lack consensus on how cutthroat 
the market is for FDI, the PRC is concerned that its current economic advantages may 
evaporate as manufacturers turn south in search of cheaper workers while more 
productive, foreign laborers reap technology and service sector investment.69 
Increasing economic competition has generated few attempts by Mekong states to 
confront China for three main reasons.  First, on key issues downstream countries “have 
little means to influence China” and, therefore, any discussion is heavily one-sided.70  
Second, Southeast Asian countries often prioritize sovereignty, autonomy, and economic 
engagement with larger powers as a disincentive to military muscle-flexing, where they 
are almost certain to lose.71  Third, Mekong states desire the dual objectives of economic 
growth and regional security—countries are reluctant to jeopardize access to China’s 
economic largesse, but they also crave security assistance against a destabilizing power.72  
Ultimately, the Southeast Asian states often take a delicate “counter-dominance” 
approach “to prevent any outside power from acquiring too much influence”—economic  
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or military—”over any country in the region or the region as a whole.”73  China should 
not interpret an absence of Mekong objections as downstream capitulation because the 
region may pursue other tactics in response. 
3. Regional Institutional Architecture 
The variety of institutions concerned with Mekong issues largely arises from the 
breadth of constituent “economic and social conditions, leading [member states] to hold 
interests and priorities that are hard to reconcile.”74  Mekong institutions include 
Southeast Asia region, Mekong sub-region, and international regulatory schemes, each 
with special foci dependent on the consensus of signatories. 
ASEAN is the preeminent multilateral forum for the Southeast Asian region.  
ASEAN broadly pursues consensus in political-security, economic, and socio-cultural 
arenas with members committed to principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and 
peaceful dispute resolution.75  China is not a member of ASEAN, but is a major dialogue 
partner in many areas.  ASEAN’s guiding principles and unanimity requirements 
constrain its policy sphere and bias output toward universal policies that respect the 
specific concerns of member states.  The ASEAN Mekong Basin Development 
Corporation (AMBDC) is a sub-unit primarily focused on rail links between southern 
China and Singapore.76 
Sub-regional institutions are differentiated by policy motivations.  The Greater 
Mekong Subregion (GMS)—members are China, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, 
and Vietnam—began in 1992 and leverages Asian Development Bank support to enhance 
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“subregional economic cooperation” spanning “nine priority sectors.”77  The GMS is 
primarily a large-scale development-minded institution, but it also serves as an 
organizing body for sub-region specialty topics such as Golden Triangle drug control, 
border zone trade, and commercial agreements.  Major initiatives include “subregional 
roads, airport and railway improvements, hydropower for cross-border power supply, 
tourism infrastructure, urban development, and communicable disease control” spanning 
56 projects worth approximately $15 billion, as of 2011.78 
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) takes inspiration from downstream 
concerns about sustainability and equality.  Established in 1995 as an agreement between 
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand, the MRC seeks “sustainable development and 
poverty alleviation” rather than unbridled economic integration.79  Flood warning 
systems, impact assessments, and hydrology data sharing are major products of the 
contemporary MRC partnership.  China is an observing “dialogue partner,” but not full 
MRC member—neither is Myanmar—largely because objections to environmental, 
sovereignty, and equitable-use articles in the founding documents.80 
International and multilateral agreements also provide institutional structure to 
Mekong engagement.  The UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Use of 
International Watercourses (1997) treaty outlines rules on “shared freshwater resources” 
issues and requires signatories to “participate in the use, development and protection of 
an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.”81  The World 
Commission on Dams (WCD), a joint venture of the World Bank and the World 
Conservation Union, promotes best practices and “alternatives for water resources and 
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energy development.”82  While these efforts have wide appeal, China actually voted 
against the UN convention and withdrew its WCD commissioner in protest.83  
China is, however, a signatory to the 2000 Lancang-Upper Mekong River 
Commercial Navigation Agreement with Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar.  This agreement 
seeks “to develop the shared river for international passenger and cargo transport, with a 
view to promoting and facilitating trade and tourism and to strengthening cooperation on 
commercial navigation.”84  The main outgrowth of this agreement is efforts to make the 
Mekong River more suitable for commercial shipping traffic.  China has “spearheaded 
and funded most of the blasting work to remove rapids, shoals, and reefs.”85 
D. SUMMARY 
This concludes an overview of the CCP’s domestic legitimacy challenges and the 
regional context for China’s Mekong policy formulation.  The Party acts to reinforce its 
political authority by pursuing economic growth, ensuring the benefits of growth are 
widely dispersed, advertising its nationalist credentials, providing security for its citizens, 
and addressing the negative consequences of recent development schemes.  Abroad, the 
regional context consists of increasing wariness regarding China’s power, and growing 
competition across economic spheres.  Wariness and competition has not yet sparked 
major conflict, perhaps due to a proliferation of diplomatic and bilateral mechanisms for 
cooperation on shared interests.  Next, this paper examines two Mekong case studies—
China’s dam building and counter-narcotics enforcement efforts—to trace how the CCP’s 
domestic legitimacy challenges interact with regional foreign objections or cooperation to 
shape the PRC’s Mekong policies. 
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III. CASE STUDY I: CHINESE DAMS 
In May 2013, at the Asia-Pacific Water Summit, Thai Prime Minister Yingluck 
Shinawatra welcomed attendees with an explicit warning on the salience of regional 
water issues: “There could be a fight over resources.”86  Zhou Xuewen from China’s 
Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) also opened with a cautionary note, but revealed a 
different concern: “Water security has become a global issue threatening sustainable 
socio-economic development.”87  The differing perspectives belie the CCP’s 
preoccupation with Mekong hydropower as an essential component of domestic 
development strategies arising from the Party’s legitimacy bargain. 
A. THE LANCANG CASCADE 
Since the 1990s, China has completed four mainstream dams on its segment of the 
Mekong River.  A fifth, larger than the others, is partially operational and will be 
completed around 2017.  Three more Chinese dams are in planning stages.  While dams 
in Yunnan Province already produce roughly 10 percent of all PRC hydropower, this 
ratio could double as more Mekong dams come online.  In Yunnan, the Mekong courses 
through favorable geography for hydropower development because the water gradually 
cascades down 800 meters of vertical elevation during its run.88  When complete, the 
eight planned dams of the “Lancang cascade” are expected to generate the equivalent of 
Vietnam’s annual electricity requirements.89 
The implications of China’s dam policies are vast.  Not only will the dams assist 
China in manipulating cross-border water flows to its advantage, but consequences exist 
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for seasonal water flow, water level management, flood warnings and control, 
sedimentation, fish migration, and other hydropower development schemes spanning the 
entire Mekong.90 
B. DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF DAM POLICY 
PRC dam building on the Mekong primarily derives from three categories of CCP 
legitimacy concerns outlined in Chapter II.  The CCP’s national economic growth and 
development imperatives form the most significant contributor to Mekong hydropower 
policy.  Next, a persistent inequality of outcomes for southwestern China—and, Yunnan 
Province in particular—adds urgency to development that delivers benefits to rural and 
ethnic regions.  Whether the Party can deliver more equitable welfare to Yunnan 
residents bears on the precarious bargain between shared benefits and authoritarian 
repression.  Last, byproducts of past development strategies—environmental damage and 
health concerns—now pose challenges to the CCP’s basis for legitimacy in the form of 
social costs imposed on citizens.  Mekong hydropower offers the CCP an attractive 
avenue to solidify its legitimacy by addressing these three components. 
1. National Economic Growth and Development Imperative 
The CCP’s political bargain demands economic growth to deliver improved 
standards of living and modernization to Chinese citizens.  A shortage of inexpensive 
power and reliable electricity—most visibly demonstrated by occasional “rolling 
brownouts” in major cities—constrains the achievement of PRC economic targets.91  
Dynamic growth rates have fueled an almost insatiable appetite for electricity from 
industrial, manufacturing, and consumer interests.  The Mekong solution to electricity 
 
 
                                                 
90 Richard Cronin, “China and the Geopolitics of the Mekong River Basin,” World Politics Review, 22 
March 2012, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11761/china-and-the-geopolitics-of-the-mekong-
river-basin-part-i. 




demand arises from the regime’s growth imperative, and is evident in the PRC’s national 
economic strategy, the favoring of domestic hydropower interests, and the institutional 
selection and forms of engagement the government pursues. 
a. PRC Economic Strategy 
Under the broad banner of a “Go West” campaign, official motivations for 
Mekong hydropower gained momentum with the “Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) for 
National Economic and Social Development” that called for a Western Development 
Strategy to increase “the development of the resource-rich western areas to promote a 
[sic] co-ordinated development among different regions of the country.”92  The Western 
Development Strategy seeks to develop Mekong River power generation to pipe 
electricity through an expansive West-East Electricity Transfer Project for use by power-
starved urban centers in the east.  Hydropower initiatives, then, serve two purposes that 
feed development measures of CCP legitimacy: Mekong dams “bring investment and 
development to China’s lagging west while satisfying the growing electricity needs of the 
country’s eastern provinces.”93  The CCP’s policies keep eastern economic motors 
humming while imparting infrastructure and capital to spark western growth. 
Anything that threatens PRC economic growth attracts particular attention 
from the CCP because it jeopardizes the Party’s economic performance.  In this vein, the 
energy security aspect of national strategy also demands dam development along the 
Mekong.  Mekong dams adhere to “China’s blueprint for order maintenance based on its 
national interest, particularly as far as access to resources is concerned.”94  Domestic 




                                                 
92 “Premier Zhu Rongji’s Explanation of 10th Five-Year Plan Drafting,” China Internet Information 
Center, http://www.china.org.cn/e-15/15-3-g/15-3-g-1.htm. 
93 “China’s West-East Electricity Transfer Project,” Wilson Center, China Environment Forum, 
http://wilsoncenter.org/wilsonweekly/chinas-west-east-electricity-transfer-project.html. 
94 Jörn Dosch, “The Fallacy of Multilateralism Rhetoric in China-Southeast Asia Relations: A Neo-
realist Perspective on Regional Order Building,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 24 (October 2010): 141. 
 30
economy—to disruption.  Power generated on the Chinese waters of the Mekong 
“provides a safer alternative to [imports transiting] the Malacca Straits” and protects the 
CCP’s economic basis for legitimacy.95 
b. Domestic Interest Groups 
The motivations of domestic hydropower interests align closely with the 
CCP’s economic growth objectives, thereby reinforcing regime stability and attaining 
political sway.  Mekong hydropower supporters include profit-seekers in the commercial 
and infrastructure development sectors, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) now subject to 
liberalization reforms, and factions in domestic water-use debates.  Together, these 
interest groups encourage CCP policies that favor dam construction on the Mekong. 
Mekong profit-seekers include large infrastructure enterprises and smaller 
commercial shipping interests.  Power generation is a big business: from 2006 to 2010, 
“Yunnan exported 160 million kilowatt-hours of power… earning US$790 million of 
income.”96  The opportunity for massive returns has drawn subsidiaries of national SOEs 
to urge dam development on domestic and foreign stretches of the Mekong River.  
Domestic lobbying generally agrees with the CCP’s western objectives, while “the 
encouragement of private capital and Chinese state-owned investment companies” has 
triggered proposals for mainstream Mekong dams in Indochina, where PRC aid 
stipulations deliver construction deals for Chinese firms.97  Collusion between Chinese 
dam operators and commercial river shippers also supports CCP economic targets: 
“China currently closes dam gates for three days and then opens them for one day to 
allow Chinese ships to travel downstream,” thereby slowing Thai and Lao northbound 
traffic and ensuring that Chinese goods reach markets faster.98 
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CCP-driven economic liberalization, while delivering astonishing 
economic growth for the country, has subjected energy SOEs to two unyielding market 
pressures that accelerate domestic dam building: (1) increased energy sector competition; 
and, (2) the requirement to earn profits.  Increased competition among electricity 
generators and providers pushes Chinese energy conglomerates to acquire and develop 
additional power capacity at greater economies of scale.99  Corporate rivalry begets a 
domestic “tragedy of the commons” where hydropower firms add fuel to the CCP’s 
development fire.  The historic relationship between SOE leaders and CCP elites also 
encourages policy bias in favor of Mekong dam construction.  As SOEs adapt to 
profitability requirements, SOE executives—sometimes dual-hatted as “members of 
official decision-making bodies”—can bend government policy to favor targeted interests 
in energy production.100  The back scratching is mutual: “the political leadership is 
dependent on successful SOEs” for widespread employment and substantial state 
revenues.101 
Economic growth policies arising from CCP legitimacy issues also propel 
Mekong dam building by corralling water-use debates along development themes.  
Natural freshwater shortages in China—exacerbated by rapid modernization—led to 
internal squabbling over water rights in ways that prioritize development viewpoints over 
other interests.  Correspondingly, PRC debates on water-use center on expected returns 
from different development schemes: how much resources should be directed towards 
coal-powered electricity generation versus hydropower dams?  Both processes require a 
great deal of water and investment. 
The potential role of Mekong-sourced energy in Party legitimacy is 
difficult to overstate: “so much of China’s GDP depends heavily on electricity produced 
in its western provinces… the energy sector trumps all other users when it comes to 
water.”102  Political considerations affect scarce resource allocation and further bias 
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policy towards domestic development: “China’s water authorities are more concerned 
about inter- and intra-provincial water disputes, as these have direct consequences for 
China’s domestic stability and economic growth.”103  Since CCP administration of 
China’s Mekong waters is so heavily geared towards domestic development outcomes 
that reinforce regime legitimacy, it is unsurprising how “the theme of [trans-border] river 
management hardly features in Chinese discourse.”104 
c. Institutional Selection and Engagement 
The CCP’s growth-based legitimacy also influences China’s institutional 
selection and the character of its Mekong engagement by entrenching its “national 
sovereignty and maximizing its room for maneuver with respect to developing water 
resources for economic growth.”105  Global options for Mekong hydropower institutions 
range from regulatory bodies to development partnerships.  Central and provincial CCP 
elites heavily favor those institutions that privilege China’s development objectives 
because of the legitimacy-building results that economic growth delivers. 
The institutions that attempt to regulate Mekong River dams include the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, and the World Commission on 
Dams (WCD).  The MRC chases “sustainable development” and “monitoring and macro-
management” goals using consensus-based agreements that would compromise the 
sovereignty of CCP development and energy policies.106  China is an observer of the 
MRC—but not a full member subject to the body’s constraints.  The UN’s prescription 
for “equitable and reasonable” use of “shared freshwater resources” would pressure the 
PRC to moderate its Mekong development scope and timelines, and subject the regime’s 
plans to external veto.107  China joins only Turkey and Burundi as the three countries in 
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the world to vote against this measure.108  In November 2000, the WCD issued a lengthy 
report advocating caution and stricter conventions regarding dam building around the 
world.  While noting that China’s 22,000 large dams dwarf the hydropower industry of 
any other country, the report struck a conciliatory tone in acknowledging “the debate 
about dams is a debate about the very meaning, purpose and pathway of development as 
well as the role that the state plays.”109  Despite this concession, the CCP saw blatant 
restrictions that would imperil its growth-oriented legitimacy bargain, so the regime 
recalled its commissioner to the WCD before rejecting its report.110   
In each of these instances, the PRC resists institutions or agreements that 
would impose limitations on Mekong dam building because the CCP’s sovereignty over 
economic development is intimately linked to regime security.  The CCP’s tenuous 
political bargain is unable to endure external restrictions on its own survival mechanisms. 
The regime’s legitimacy challenges drive preferences for institutions and 
agreements that align with China’s growth and development strategies.  In this vein, the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), the Lancang-Upper Mekong Commercial Navigation 
Agreement (LUMCNA), and bilateral negotiations feature prominently in China’s 
cooperation on Mekong policy.  The Asian Development Bank’s partnership with 
regional states in the GMS embodies regional extensions of the CCP’s domestic aims by 
supporting key enablers of economic growth: “projects in transport, energy, 
telecommunications, environment, human resource development, tourism, trade, private 
sector investment, and agriculture.”111  The commercial navigation agreement similarly 
reflects a narrow focus on Mekong development that eschews downstream protest—
China takes a leading role in executing the agreement by dredging and dynamiting 
existing river geography in Laos and Myanmar’s territory to facilitate commercial vessel 
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transport.112  The importance of river trade to the PRC is underscored by China’s 
investments in Mekong shipping—”about 80% of ships on the Mekong today are 
Chinese.”113  Last, the CCP’s pursuit of economic growth is manifested in an almost non-
negotiable assertion that Mekong negotiations must be bilateral, such that the regime can 
leverage China’s economic and geopolitical heft to optimize prospects for regime 
security.114  Dangling “market access to Yunnan” in front of downstream neighbors is 
often enough to convince contentious states to embrace bilateral agreements that favor 
the CCP’s economic development goals.115 
If the PRC’s engagement mechanisms follow from domestic regime 
legitimacy questions, the same factors shape the character of China’s Mekong 
engagement.  What little cooperation and sharing exists is beset by Chinese refusal to 
share basic details about its hydropower plans and operations, lest they become subject to 
foreign obstruction that would undermine the CCP’s economic strategy.  Though the 
CCP has designs for additional Mekong dams, uncertainty regarding existing operations 
abounds with a “lack of transparency regarding how it manages its current dams.”116  
When China does conduct environmental impact studies on dam building, the results are 
either hidden or highly questionable.117  The Economist notes that even Chinese 
academics are stymied at basic inquiries about Mekong dam policy: those “in favour of 
hydropower development complain that nearly all relevant information, even the amount 
of rain that reaches them, is treated as a state secret.”118  Not only does the CCP’s 
development-based legitimacy shape what avenues China selects for engagement, it 
diminishes the character of what little communication exists. 
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2. Addressing Yunnan Inequality 
Economic liberalization has delivered skewed results for China’s citizens.  
Delayed development of the Mekong hinterland and corresponding inequality risks 
fractures in CCP legitimacy along regional or ethnic lines.  The CCP hopes that economic 
and political pathways to Mekong hydropower will solidify Party legitimacy by resolving 
Yunnan’s development shortfalls. 
a. Economic Pathways 
PRC economic strategy pursues western development as a means to 
enhance national growth.  However, China’s Western Development Strategy and “Go 
West” directive also seek to include Yunnan’s population in economic benefits that 
alleviate regional and ethnic inequality.  Without the fruits of modernization to balance 
the CCP’s political repression, regime legitimacy suffers.  In 1999, PRC Premier Zhu 
Rongji revealed CCP legitimacy concerns in explaining how “Going West” is ultimately 
meant to “strengthen national unity” and “safeguard social stability.”119  Four years later, 
Zhu was more specific about the danger that inequality portends: “If we do not change 
these conditions, they will severely damp farmers’ enthusiasm to produce, undermine the 
foundation of agriculture, and even threaten the overall health of the national 
economy.”120 
Though long-term fortifications to Party legitimacy accrue in conjunction 
with other Yunnan development initiatives, the immediate benefits of Mekong dams 
include construction employment and electricity—an in-demand, exportable commodity.  
Although questions remain on whether jobs and revenues will filter down to rural 
Yunnan residents, the scale of CCP interest belies sensitivity to dangers of inequality: 
“over the past 15 years the central government has poured over half a trillion dollars into 
the west.”121  Improved employment cultivates other benefits that strengthen the CCP’s 
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hold on power, like reducing urban migration, raising rural incomes, and limiting social 
discontent.122  Foreign electricity sales have already earned Yunnan almost one billion 
dollars since 2006, a re-investable revenue stream for additional development.123  Major 
infrastructure projects and imported skilled workers will make Yunnan “more attractive 
for domestic and foreign investment.”124  In these ways, Mekong dams are one 
component of larger economic efforts to alleviate inequality to reinforce CCP legitimacy.  
Though western inequality is a regional issue, Yunnan’s development 
disparities weigh on ethnic minorities that comprise almost 40 percent of the provincial 
population.  Ethnic inequality represents “a perennial issue in the Chinese Communist 
Party’s quest for political stability” because political repression has dissuaded a “national 
identity” for Chinese citizens of all backgrounds.125  The Party attempts to avoid ethnic 
dimensions of inequality by stressing growth and inclusiveness—”We are all one 
family.”126  Therefore, CCP legitimacy gaps may drive Mekong dam policy to resolve 
ethnic inequality, but elites publicly minimize ethnic themes in favor of development and 
unity rhetoric.  
b. Political Pathways 
CCP legitimacy problems based on inequality also shape political 
approaches to Mekong dam programs that embed more authority at provincial levels.  To 
be sure, the Party is strictly hierarchical and provincial policy must align with central 
authority.  However, the destabilizing effects of inequality—on legitimacy built around 
economic inclusiveness—drive the CCP to delegate more political responsibility to 
Yunnan Province to pursue Mekong dam policy. 
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Conventional narratives suggest that the CCP is unlikely to cede central 
authority.  However, the regime views this political delegation as a means to resolving 
regional inequality sooner: “Beijing has urged the border provinces to expand their 
opening up to the neighboring countries in order to accelerate the economic development 
in those provinces.”127   
Yunnan Province’s roadmap towards development emphasizes three main 
themes, largely plucked from concerns about ethnic and economic inequality: (1) 
becoming a “strong province in ethnic cultures;” (2) pursuit of “green economy” 
industries; and, (3) economic integration with neighboring states through a “Grand Route 
Way.”128  Provincial officials were quick to advertise Mekong hydropower—a “green 
economy” industry in PRC parlance—as a tactical pathway to national aims: “In the case 
of the Mekong, Chinese policies are mainly driven by Yunnan Province.”129  Yunnan’s 
advocacy for Mekong dam development earned the province a “privileged” position as 
“the main Chinese representative in GMS” on development issues, while the central Party 
leadership reserves primacy on trans-border security concerns.130  In addition to its 
outsized GMS role, Yunnan also solicits international audiences for “foreign investment 
into hydropower projects.”131 
Yunnan’s elevated political responsibilities feed a CCP ulterior motive: 
GMS partners increasingly conceptualize Mekong dam development as producers (like 
Yunnan) generating power for unmet regional demand, rather than a geopolitical 
competition pitting the PRC behemoth against tiny, downstream neighbors.132  This 
narrative works domestically as well to help Yunnan officials lobby other CCP elites for 
stronger Party support to resolve western inequality.  Ultimately, the Party’s 
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contemporary legitimacy calculations urge for Mekong hydropower development to 
improve Yunnan’s outcomes, and political delegation from Beijing to the province 
accelerates this mission.133 
3. Environmental and Health Degradation 
CCP authoritarianism has, to date, biased the regime toward narrow definitions of 
development that neglect externalities from energy policy.  However, the CCP’s evolving 
legitimacy calculations now must consider how environmental degradation—and ensuing 
health crises—may lead to social unrest that undermines Party authority.  Mekong dams 
offer the CCP opportunities for alternative energy sector development while alleviating 
domestic constituents of some negative externalities from conventional power generation. 
The PRC is heavily reliant on coal to power its economy: “Coal generates nearly 
80 percent of the country’s electricity, and China now burns half the coal consumed in 
the world annually.”134  Unfortunately, extensive coal burning for electricity and heating 
has rendered China’s urban air pollution the worst in the world.135  Far from a benign 
outcome, environmental degradation is triggering widespread health crises—”cancer 
clusters”—and “‘mass protests’ stirred by pollution.”136  The CCP’s narrow pursuit of 
growth to buttress its legitimacy has considered environmental shortfalls “very much as 
externalities,” but this mindset has spurred new social discontent directed at the 
regime.137 
Environmental and health degradation threatens CCP legitimacy because they 
undermine the Party’s economic inclusiveness obligation.  The regime’s acknowledgment 
that “air pollution has reached an extremely critical state” is evident in the “12th Five-
Year Plan on Air Pollution Prevention and Control in Key Regions (2012)” that proposes 
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numerous new safeguards and limits on pollutants.138  Moreover, China’s 2012 Energy 
Policy directs “rapid development in non-fossil energy... and renewable energy 
resources.”139  The policy shifts to address air pollution are “not in response to citizens’ 
environmental complaints but derivative of concerns over growing social unrest” that 
highlight party legitimacy weaknesses and potential catalysts against CCP authority.140  
CCP legitimacy challenges arising from negative externalities to growth policies add to 
the tide of official support for Mekong dam construction because hydropower provides 
cleaner electricity generation and transfers most negative externalities away from 
domestic social groups, and downriver to Indochina. 
C. DAMS SUMMARY 
The CCP’s precarious bargain that balances political extraction with economic 
inclusiveness shapes Mekong hydropower policy through the regime’s attempts to 
solidify its governing legitimacy.  Chinese Mekong dam construction and operating 
policies are bolstered by the Party’s pursuit of stronger legitimacy through economic 
growth and development strategy, reductions in national inequality, and improvements in 
citizen welfare.  These links argue that China will continue to press for Mekong dams as 
a pathway to improved CCP legitimacy and stability that is prioritized over the objections 
or concerns of its downstream neighbors. 
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IV. CASE STUDY II: CHINESE COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY 
Mekong waters flow through the Golden Triangle—the border region downstream 
of China between Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand—where a legacy of “large scale opium 
cultivation” now competes with modern demand for amphetamine-type stimulants 
(ATS).141  In past decades, PRC counter-narcotics policy for the Mekong River has taken 
a multifaceted approach cognizant of the economic, governance, and social implications 
of drug production, smuggling, and consumption, yet tempered by motivations to solve 
domestic problems before tackling external challenges.  Since October 2011, however, 
China’s Mekong counter-narcotics policy has shifted due to domestic political 
calculations regarding the murder of 13 Chinese citizens by Mekong narcotics traffickers.  
The policy departure reveals the CCP’s sensitivity to nationalism and security 
components of the regime’s legitimacy that accompanies economic expansion. 
A. HISTORICAL POLICY TRAJECTORY 
The Mekong’s role as an economic gateway partly arises from its legacy of illicit 
narcotics trafficking.  Early networks of trans-border ethnic groups utilized the Mekong 
as a natural route to move drugs into Chinese territory, and triggered the initial PRC 
policy responses.  Since “60-70 percent of the drugs consumed in China” now originate 
near the Mekong’s shores, Yunnan Province’s counter-narcotics efforts garner national 
attention and serve as testing ground for PRC policies.142 
In the early 1980s, China “launched its first antidrug police department” and 
experimented with “community-based drug rehabilitation programs” near the Mekong’s 
headwaters in Yunnan Province.143  During the 1990s and early 2000s, the PRC’s 
Mekong counter-narcotics strategies included foreign direct investment and development 
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aid programs, alternative agriculture schemes, rural training and education, and 
preferential trade deals.  China’s law enforcement and security focus, short of modest 
regional police exchanges, were primarily confined to its own borders.144 
The CCP’s escalating focus on national counter-narcotics policy emerged in 
conjunction with China’s modernization and enrichment.  Improved transportation 
networks and infrastructure enabled traffickers to serve consumers’ growing demand for 
illicit drugs.  Regime elites increasingly perceived “drug trafficking and abuse as a major 
threat to China’s national security, economy, and stability.”145  In 2004, Hu Jintao 
articulated the regime’s response to expanding narcotics problems in the “People’s War 
on Illicit Drugs.”  Despite historic parallels to other CCP mobilization campaigns, the 
People’s War prescribes mostly domestic treatments for the economic and social 
complications arising from the illicit narcotics industry: “drug prevention and education; 
drug treatment and rehabilitation; drug source blocking and interdiction; ‘strike hard’ 
drug law enforcement; and strict control and supervision… of precursor chemicals.”146  
The most significant institutional outgrowth of the People’s War is the National Narcotics 
Control Commission (NNCC) that coordinates Ministry of Public Security (MPS) law 
enforcement activities, General Administration of Customs (GAC) anti-smuggling 
efforts, and State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) regulation of controlled 
substances.147 
Before 2011, China’s Mekong counter-narcotics pursuits emphasized limited 
multilateralism and numerous—though basic—bilateral agreements.  China’s multilateral 
avenues for drug policy—especially with ASEAN member states—mainly dealt with 
“soft mechanisms of cooperation that focus on information sharing, better coordination, 
the operation of reciprocity, the lowering of transaction costs, mutual learning, and the 
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building up of trust.”148  The ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to 
Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD) of 2000 announced the ambitious goal of a “drug-free 
ASEAN” by 2015, but solidified only vague trans-border cooperation commitments.149  
The ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime of 2002 recommended—but 
did not guarantee—initial forays towards cooperation through “drug liaison officers” and 
regulatory explanations.150   
China has been most active in bilateral negotiations and agreements on broader 
law and regulatory cooperation.  In recent years, the PRC “signed 58 bilateral treaties on 
legal assistance and extradition with 40 countries” that serve as a foundation for interstate 
dialogue and partnership requests.151  More specifically for Mekong interaction, China 
leverages “Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) currently in place with Laos, 
Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, and the United Nations Drug Control Program 
and regularly participates in a variety of drug conferences and bilateral meetings.”152  
Prior to 2011, China’s foreign engagement on Mekong counter-narcotic policy was 
noteworthy for its wide breadth with minimal depth, and the enshrinement of economic 
development and sovereignty priorities in official policy and agreements. 
China plunged into action against Mekong narcotics rings following the gruesome 
deaths of 13 Chinese riverboat operators on 5 October 2011 (the “10-5 Incident”), 
allegedly massacred by a drug ring led by Myanmar-based kingpin Naw Kham.  The 
bodies were found mutilated and floating in the Mekong River in a Thai section of the 
Golden Triangle, but the killings could have occurred upstream in Laos or Myanmar.  
                                                 
148 Ralf Emmers, “International Regime Building in Southeast Asia: ASEAN Cooperation Against the 
Illicit Trafficking and Abuse of Drugs,” (working paper No. 106, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 
February 2006, 18. 
149 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “Press Release of ASEAN and China on a Joint Regional 
Plan to Achieve a Drug-Free ASEAN by 2015,” news release, 13 October 2000, 
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/press-release-of-asean-and-
china-on-a-joint-regional-plan-to-achieve-a-drug-free-asean-by-2015-bangkok-thailand-13-october-2000. 
150 Emmers, “Globalization and Non-Traditional Security Issues,” 14–15. 
151 “INCSR” 2011, 189. 
152 “INCSR” 2012, 167. 
 44
Nearby, the Chinese boats were found laden with illegal pills.  The incident triggered an 
aggressive, cross-border Chinese policy intervention that continues in late 2013.153 
Almost immediately, the PRC halted “passenger and cargo traffic in the 
headwaters of the Mekong.”154  China summoned ministers from Laos, Thailand, and 
Myanmar to Beijing and “pressured the countries to participate in Chinese-led river 
patrols, intended to ensure security for the river trade.”155  In addition to a Chinese-led 
fortification of Laos and Myanmar’s defense infrastructure, the river patrols continue 
with the deployment of hundreds of Chinese officers, including some at what has been 
called “China’s first military base abroad” by Chinese sources.156  The “10-5 Incident” 
exposed CCP legitimacy challenges tied to the Party’s cultivation of nationalism and 
inherent security imperatives that have swayed Mekong counter-narcotics policy since. 
B. DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF PRC COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY 
The recent shift in China’s counter-narcotics policies on the Mekong River trace 
from two categories of CCP legitimacy challenges delineated in Chapter II.  Growing 
nationalism, embedded by the regime as glue between the people and the Party, serves as 
a relief valve for political extraction in channeling citizen frustration into unifying 
propaganda and policies.  The regime’s manipulation of nationalism filters and redirects 
discontent away from the CCP and towards Mekong actors.  Second, to compensate for 
political repression, the Party’s legitimacy depends on how effectively the CCP enforces 
its security imperative.  As PRC economic interests expand geographically, the CCP 
faces new challenges to demonstrate competence in protecting its citizens and 
commercial interests around the world.  The 2011 Mekong murders of Chinese citizens 
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rekindled challenges to the CCP’s legitimacy on nationalist and security fronts that 
catalyze a more aggressive counter-narcotics response than historical policy predicted. 
1. Nationalism 
Nationalist outrage at the deaths of Chinese citizens on the Mekong River is 
reflected in two aspects of China’s policy response.  First, domestic outlets of nationalist 
sentiment present an opportunity for the Party to align policy with widespread, relatively-
unified citizen viewpoints in ways that enhance CCP legitimacy by securing its 
nationalist credentials and deflecting criticism over China’s borders.  Second, the CCP 
pursues Mekong counter-narcotics policy that satisfies nationalist expectations of China’s 
rising power to exercise influence abroad for demonstrable results. 
a. Domestic Outlets 
The CCP’s manipulation and perception of Chinese nationalism—what 
David Shambaugh calls “open discourse in a constrained environment”—arises from the 
politically extractive denominators of China’s political bargain that repress liberal ideals 
and regime criticism.157  Domestic outlets of nationalism provide the CCP a malleable 
relief valve from other extractive institutions and reveal policy options backed by unified 
citizen support. 
Nationalist currents surrounding the 10-5 Incident are most evident in the 
Chinese media’s role in galvanizing public outrage against the alleged Mekong 
perpetrators, and advocating aggressive policy solutions for Party consideration that 
alleviate nationalist legitimacy concerns.  This fits with a broader trend where the 
Chinese media has taken an elevated role in molding agendas and vetting policy 
responses on topics in foreign relations, though media maneuvers are largely constrained 
by CCP elites who “rein it in through various internal and external mechanisms.”158  
Chinese news outlets not only detailed the grisly Mekong murders, but stoked passion for 
months by likening the search and prosecution of Naw Kham to “the killing of al-Qaeda 
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leader Osama bin Laden by U.S. forces.”159  Print and television media “extensively 
covered” even the nonviolent episodes such as the court trial—”nearly 200 journalists 
attended”—and the PRC’s payouts of over $20,000 to each of the victims’ families.160  In 
one of the more extreme nationalist appeals by news media, Mekong narcotics traffickers 
were labeled “common enemies of mankind.”161 
If the play-by-play reporters sensationalized events, leading news 
editorials competed along nationalist lines in explicitly demanding more aggressive PRC 
policies.  The Southern Metropolis Daily argued, “China should go beyond mechanical 
adherence to ‘non-interference in internal affairs’” and pursue the “most direct and 
effective” safeguards for Chinese concerns.162  The Global Times demanded that China 
“teach the drug smugglers in the region a hard lesson.”163  Not to be outdone, the CCP’s 
propaganda outlet, The People’s Daily, outlined wide-ranging initiatives that foretold 
actual policy: “send police attaches to countries involved… carry out armed convoys… 
establish a risk-assessment system for the security of its perimeter and other overseas 
regions as soon as possible.”164 
The internet provides another outlet for nationalist expression among 
ordinary citizens in ways that bias CCP elites to legitimacy-enhancing policy responses.   
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Though official curbs and censors limit the free online expression of citizen disapproval, 
internet posts can sensitize the CCP to nationalist currents and underscore tenuous regime 
legitimacy: 
When public opinion is split, the government does not pay attention’, a 
mid-level foreign ministry official said. ‘But if an overwhelming majority 
of views on chat sites and in newspaper columns reflect a unified view on 
an issue, officials feel the need to act cautiously because they do not want 
dissatisfaction to escalate and lead to street protests.165 
Moreover, while other areas of citizen discontent are usually off-limits, “the internet is a 
useful outlet for nationalists to blow off steam” because the policy implications of 
nationalism generally unite citizens under the CCP’s leadership against foreign actors.166 
The 10-5 Incident provided visceral fodder for online nationalists in China: 
“shortly after the killings, the pictures of the dead boatmen circulated heavily on Chinese 
websites and social media platforms.  Graphic documentation of the boat interiors and 
pictures of Thai authorities fishing out bodies inflamed public sentiment.”167  The CCP’s 
precarious balancing act on nationalist issues was tested as online posts veered towards 
criticism of the government for its poor protection of citizens working abroad, “an 
increasingly emotive topic” after other attacks against Chinese.168 
Nationalist tides on the internet and in news media feed CCP calculations 
about how best to orchestrate Mekong counter-narcotics operations that strengthened 
regime legitimacy.  Increasingly, nationalist policy grows from “an ongoing intensive 
internal debate, and represents a current consensus among the more conservative and 
nationalist elements to toughen its policies and selectively throw China’s weight 
around.”169  On Mekong counter-narcotics policy, the CCP’s manipulation of nationalism 
posed a “double-edged sword” in that the Party risked citizen anger at foreign criminals 
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boiling over into broader dissatisfaction with the regime.170  Therefore, “Beijing was 
determined to cool public anger” by ensuring that Party leadership “was swift and 
decisive and ordered at the highest levels.”171  CCP elites directed an abrupt pause in all 
Mekong shipping and dispatched armed boats to usher stranded vessels back to Yunnan 
Province. 
b. Rising Power Expectations 
Another way that Party-cultivated nationalism influences Mekong 
counter-narcotics policy is through the regime’s obligation to satisfy domestic 
expectations of China as a rising power.  China’s emergence as an economic and military 
power reinforces and further inspires nationalist perceptions about state capacity on the 
Mekong River.  The nationalist underpinnings of CCP legitimacy encourage Mekong 
counter-narcotics policies that confirm the value of Chinese lives and demonstrate state 
capacity to achieve results worthy of a rising power. 
Rising power nationalism features accelerating expectations about how the 
government values and protects the lives of its citizens.  From a nationalist’s perspective, 
state greatness is confirmed by the regime’s ability to protect its constituents and interests 
abroad.  Following the Mekong murders, Vice Foreign Minister Song Tao explained the 
CCP’s motivations in nationalist rather than economic or legal terms: “The Chinese 
government values the life and safety of every Chinese citizen.”172  Additionally, ethnic 
Chinese along the Mekong River, particularly those with business holdings in Lao special 
economic zones, identified themselves as residents of a “second homeland” within a 
greater sphere of PRC protection.173  In pushing for expansive protection of ethnic  
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Chinese, PRC citizens, and their Mekong business interests, the CCP redefined its 
nationalist redlines on the Mekong River and helped cement the Party’s nationalist bona 
fides. 
A better measure of the CCP’s nationalist legitimacy is found in the PRC’s 
achievement of Mekong counter-piracy results that confirm China’s rise for domestic 
nationalists.  In a region known for constraining norms of non-interference and rigid 
territorial sovereignty, China publicly made official “demands [for] a thorough 
investigation” by Mekong countries, and “asserted jurisdiction over the case” based on 
victim links outside of standard legal justifications.174  The casual handover of Naw 
Kham and his gang—Laos simply turned over the suspects to the PRC absent a formal 
request—further illustrated China’s ability to extract lopsided results.  Finally, the rapid 
decrease in narcotics-related violence on the Mekong River that coincided with armed 
PRC patrols is testimony to the CCP’s power to improve conditions for Chinese citizens.  
As one Laotian soldier explained to Chinese press: “There are no more pirates now.  The 
Chinese told the Burmese to stop them.”175  To Chinese nationalists, the mechanisms of 
China’s growing influence drove actions that confirmed the CCP’s nationalist credentials 
and the PRC’s greatness as a responsible power. 
2. Security Imperative 
The Mekong murders of October 2011 highlighted a security deficiency that 
undermines China’s balance between extractive politics and inclusive economics.  Under 
this bargain, Party legitimacy increasingly depends on satisfying greater security 
requirements as economic pursuits extend abroad.  Following the logic of Olson and 
Bates, if the CCP is unable to provide the services demanded of a stationary bandit, 
Chinese citizens will be reluctant to endure the regime’s political extraction.  Since 2011, 
China’s assertive responses to Mekong narcotics trafficking violence arise from the 
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security imperative part of regime legitimacy, and are evident in the CCP’s tactics to 
address new challenges and gain credibility as the competent security specialists on the 
Mekong River. 
a. New Challenges at the Mekong Frontier 
China’s “Going Out” strategy pursues returns abroad and means that its 
citizens and interests are charting pathways through insecure economic frontiers.  
Expanding economic frontiers yield new security pressures for a regime with a historical 
bias towards a “noninterventionist foreign policy.”176  The Mekong River is one of 
China’s growing commercial arteries, and the October 2011 narcotics violence struck at 
the CCP’s legitimacy by demonstrating the Party’s failure to secure Chinese interests 
downriver.  The Mekong narcotics trade presents a newly, salient security challenge at 
China’s southern economic frontier, and the regime’s recent counter-narcotics policy 
aims to solidify its legitimacy through assertive security enforcement. 
Though lawlessness in the Golden Triangle is an enduring phenomenon, 
the 10-5 Incident’s sensationalism magnified Mekong threats and highlighted “the need 
to ensure security of the growing number of Chinese citizens working in conflict-prone 
areas.”177  On initial review, Mekong insecurity shares characteristics with other trouble 
spots affecting China’s international trade: China already conducts patrols with Vietnam 
in the Gulf of Tonkin, sustains anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and 
increasingly deploys Ministry of Public Security (MPS) officers abroad.178  However, 
China’s armed security officers patrolling the Mekong River have the CCP’s license to 
employ force against citizens of neighboring states on their own territory.  The Mekong 
patrol scheme, advertised as “joint” but overwhelmingly Chinese by virtue of state 
capacity and regime motivation, “suggests a changing Chinese security consciousness 
that recognizes Beijing must be much more involved beyond its borders to preserve and 
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protect its interests.”179  China’s counter-narcotics security enforcement on the Mekong 
River presents an escalated example of the CCP’s security mandate to protect Chinese 
economic interests abroad, and thereby reinforce Party legitimacy at home. 
A second aspect of the modern Mekong security challenge is that the 
proliferation of infrastructure, workers, and transport vessels on the Mekong provides a 
steady flow of potential victims into areas vulnerable to Mekong narcotics gangs.  
Enterprising “criminal gangs have used the increasing volume of shipping along the 
Mekong to traffic drugs” and commit robberies.180  Development has proven a windfall 
for the illicit Mekong narcotics business.   
Development-driven illicit activity mixes with downstream states’ 
impotence or unwillingness to provide security for growing economic activity and further 
aggravates the CCP’s legitimacy fears.  How much faith should the PRC place in weaker 
countries to defend China’s businesspeople and shipping vessel operators?  Downstream 
states have different legitimacy concerns that drive different priorities: For example, 
Myanmar’s “government considers drug enforcement secondary to national stability and 
is willing to allow narcotics trafficking in border areas in exchange for cooperation from 
ethnic armed groups and militias.”181  The CCP’s prioritization of its own security-
legitimacy uncertainties illustrates how “Beijing’s central role in organizing the Mekong 
patrols was clearly a vote of no confidence in its Southeast Asian neighbors’ ability to 
secure Chinese interests.”  The resulting setting prompts the PRC to pursue more 
assertive measures as the only regional actor likely to deliver security that satisfies the 
Party’s legitimacy bargain as a specialist in state violence. 
The CCP’s security imperative against Mekong criminal syndicates also 
generated a series of first-ever initiatives geared towards enhancing the regime’s security 
qualifications.  Following the murders in October 2011, PRC elites “ordered an 
unprecedented manhunt” spanning multiple borders “to apprehend the murderers,” and 
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publicly “considered using a drone to kill the alleged mastermind of the attack.”182  After 
the capture of Naw Kham and his accomplices, the PRC’s judicial system prosecuted its 
inaugural “case in which foreigners committed crimes in foreign countries that damaged 
Chinese citizens’ personal and/or property rights.”183  The Chinese-led Mekong River 
patrols were groundbreaking because “they enabled China, for the first time, to establish 
a downstream military presence in the China–Myanmar and Myanmar–Laos portions of 
the Mekong.”184  The importance of Mekong security operations to the CCP is 
underscored by how the counter-narcotics operations represented “the first time in almost 
three decades that Chinese security forces have operated beyond the borders of China in a 
mission that was not mandated by the United Nations, but rather for its own national 
security interests.”185 
The CCP’s new policies risk blowback from China’s Mekong neighbors.  
Paul Chambers notes that China’s assertiveness might draw “charges of gunboat 
diplomacy,” the imperialist tactic of coercion disdained across Asia.186  The PRC’s 
imposition of legal jurisdiction over foreign citizens in foreign territories also could 
imperil Mekong security partnerships.  China’s reputation for harsh punishment—the 
high “rate of severe penalties, including death, in drug cases”—presents an international 
dilemma when ruthlessly applied to non-Chinese suspects.187  However, the risk of 
political fallout from China’s new policies further underscores the CCP’s prioritization of 
domestic legitimacy concerns.  Cumulatively, despite the risk of angering its neighbors 
through heavy-handed treatment, the CCP’s recent initiatives to prosecute new security 
challenges on the Mekong denote a more assertive path to guaranteeing its regime 
legitimacy. 
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b. Security Competence 
The CCP’s political extraction depends, in part, on the Party’s monopoly 
on violence over China’s citizens and their economic interests.  China’s new counter-
narcotics policies reveal the CCP’s fear of appearing incompetent on Mekong security 
matters to domestic audiences.  The Party’s rehabilitation of its security competency is 
exhibited in its effective prosecution of Mekong narcotics criminals, and in the PRC’s 
assertive conduct with other Mekong states. 
The cautious pace of China’s international security participation reveals 
that China’s political elites fear appearing incompetent through “embarrassing failures at 
the hands of unprofessional militants.”188  Such is the case on the Mekong River, where 
China’s economic strategy was paralyzed by the insecurity generated by unsophisticated 
criminals: “Naw Kham has become a near-legendary figure. So many shipping attacks 
are attributed to this 46-year-old ethnic Shan that it seems as if the Mekong ambitions of 
the Asian superpower are being foiled by a medieval-style drug lord with a few dozen hill 
tribe gunmen.”189  If Mekong brigands and smugglers can operate with impunity, where 
is the security deterrent for China’s domestic protest, separatist, or terrorist movements? 
Segments of the CCP’s counter-narcotics response are geared towards 
demonstrating the regime’s security competence against criminals.  China’s improving 
power projection capabilities were advertised both in the revelation of UAV strike plans, 
and in the massive cross-border manhunt orchestrated by the Ministry of Public Security.  
As a leading MPS official stated, “China was able to rely on contacts developed over the 
past decade from the training of more than 1,500 police officers in Southeast Asia” and 
on informal networks of ethnic Chinese along the Mekong supplied intelligence.190  In 
China, Naw Kham was equated with Osama bin Laden.  UAV strikes were floated in the 
press.  These images bolster the CCP’s security qualifications by drawing parallels to 
other great power operations against international criminal networks. 
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The Party’s counter-narcotics responses also demonstrate China’s 
influential role as the preeminent security provider on the Mekong River.  Part of the 
CCP’s challenge in reinforcing its security credentials was overcoming territorial or 
sovereignty sensitivities of its downstream neighbors.  Immediately following the 
murders, “an angry Chinese government” unilaterally made the drastic decision to halt all 
Mekong shipping, and Beijing “summoned” ministers from Thailand, Laos, and 
Myanmar for “urgent talks.”191  To avoid a potential Thai whitewash of the crime scene 
investigation, Beijing “quickly dispatched their own team of experts to assist the Thais 
with their investigation.”192  The initial Mekong patrols were launched “to great fanfare” 
and ceremony from Yunnan in mid-December 2011, and sailed from Chinese territory, 
along the Laos-Myanmar border, and into Thailand’s waters.193  Moreover, the joint river 
security teams featured the CCP’s stamp with over twice as many Chinese officers as all 
other countries combined, and domestic press celebrated the PRC’s leading role in 
“making the Mekong safer.”194   
Perhaps the greatest demonstration of the CCP’s specialization in—and 
monopoly on—violence came during the trial and punishment phases.  Rather than 
delegate the judicial process to a less-motivated state, the CCP assumed jurisdiction and 
extradition over the crimes, “the suspects were brought back to Kunming, Yunnan 
province, and Lao and Myanmese policemen were also flown in to testify against the 
traffickers.”  If the Chinese courtroom failed to impress, the punishment phase was a live 
advertisement for the CCP’s security competence: Chinese state media showed the 
criminals being “paraded live on state television, trussed with ropes and shackled in 
chains, as police led them from the jail to a bus taking them to the place of execution.”  
The execution was not televised, but the Party left little doubt about among Chinese 
citizens of the regime’s commitment and competence in the security arena. 
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C. COUNTER-NARCOTICS SUMMARY 
Before October 2011, China’s counter-narcotics policies were predominantly 
domestic, limited, and relatively uncontroversial.  Cooperation with other states was 
widely discussed and paid token consideration, but rarely executed in significant depth.  
However, the Mekong murders unsettled the CCP’s political bargain by inflaming 
nationalism and questioning the regime’s security guarantees.  In prioritizing domestic 
legitimacy concerns, the CCP enacted new counter-narcotics policies reflecting greater 
deference to Chinese nationalism and security imperatives on the Mekong River.  As a 
result, China’s counter-narcotics efforts are now increasingly broad, assertive, and 
directed abroad.  Mekong cooperation is now tilted towards Beijing’s demands for policy 
effectiveness, and for the moment, the threats to river shipping associated with narcotics 
trafficking appear to be mitigated. 
The CCP’s Mekong River counter-narcotics policies—though triggered by 
domestic nationalism and security components of regime legitimacy—have imposed 
conditions for commerce approximating a public good.  Trafficker arrests and drug 
confiscations are up and security is much improved.  The southward push of Chinese 
economic interests has fueled demand for public goods that downstream states were 
previously unwilling or unable to provide.  However, this chapter has shown that the 
dominant influence of the CCP’s domestic legitimacy concerns in policy formulation 
means that the PRC’s behavior should not be interpreted as international altruism, but 
rather as extracting disproportionate benefits for the regime at home. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter summarizes the CCP’s legitimacy challenges, the foreign context 
surrounding Mekong policies, and how each case study reflects different aspects of the 
Party’s fragile legitimacy.  Then, conclusions about the PRC’s Mekong policies are 
elucidated to provide a foundation on which to extract broader implications for China’s 
relations. 
A. SUMMARY 
Chapter II outlines broad categories of legitimacy challenges that arise from the 
unique political bargain in China featuring a balance between extractive political and 
inclusive economic institutions.  The most significant legitimacy factor is the Party’s 
evolving economic growth imperative, now in a fourth decade since Deng Xiaoping’s 
early economic reforms.  Modern iterations of the growth imperative stress a “Going 
Out” strategy that aims for greater returns abroad, despite the higher risks from foreign 
competition, resentment, and hostility.  Second, diverging outcomes undermine the 
Party’s political bargain by limiting the inclusiveness of development and modernization.  
Inequality for broad segments of rural, western, or ethnic minority citizens undermines 
the regime’s authority where it fails to deliver benefits.  Third, the CCP’s endorsement 
and manipulation of nationalism strengthens its ruling legitimacy by allowing safer 
outlets for domestic political frustration that focus anger abroad while presenting 
unifying policy options at home.  Fourth, the regime’s security imperative to monopolize 
violence surrounding Chinese interests at home and abroad reveals the CCP’s 
fundamental obligation to set conditions that enable production and returns.  Domestic 
perceptions of CCP-provided security underscore a responsibility to protect citizens and 
deter additional challenges to order.  Last, China’s politically extractive institutions have 
deafened elites to shortcomings in quality-of-life and other, meaningful measures of 
development.  Negative externalities, especially in the health and environmental spheres, 
impose costs on Chinese citizens that risk social unrest and demand alternative pathways 
to modernization. 
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Regional trends provide foreign context upon which to analyze China’s Mekong 
policies.  China’s actions since 2008 have prompted changing perceptions about the 
validity of “win-win” official proclamations.  Analysts draw links between China’s 
increasingly assertive behavior and heightened wariness among China’s neighbors.  
Competition is also growing—for natural resources, market access, and foreign direct 
investment—that draws predictions of confrontation.  To date, expected confrontation has 
been mostly deferred by Indochinese states due to China’s vast power advantages, 
regional norms that downplay military clashes in favor of sovereignty and non-
interference, and Asian desires to leverage the PRC’s dynamic growth to achieve 
domestic economic targets.  The institutional architecture and series of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements also define the spectrum for China’s engagement with Mekong 
countries. 
Chapter III examines China’s Mekong dam policies and traces how they are 
shaped by three aspects of regime legitimacy.  The CCP’s economic growth imperative is 
evident in how national economic strategy mandates hydropower construction to generate 
energy for eastern industry and consumers, the influence of domestic hydropower 
interests in policy formation, and in the PRC’s selection of pro-development partnerships 
across the region.  The dangers to the Party’s legitimacy posed by inequality along 
regional or ethnic cleavages also drive Mekong dam policy through economic and 
political attempts to share the benefits of modernization.  Externalities of previous 
economic growth schemes—health and environmental calamities—offer a third threat to 
the regime’s political authority, and trigger the CCP’s search for alternative energy 
development that relieves Chinese citizens of burdens associated with rapid, coal-
powered development. 
Chapter IV focuses on components of the CCP’s legitimacy that help form 
China’s counter-narcotics policies on the Mekong River.  Legacy counter-narcotics 
policies revealed the regime’s concerns about negative impacts to its economic growth 
imperative: drugs diminish worker productivity, impose social health burdens, and 
undermine the regulatory state’s rule-of-law.  However, beginning in October 2011, 
Mekong events triggered a policy departure that reflects the Party’s calculations about 
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Chinese nationalism and the regime’s security imperative.  The effects of nationalism on 
the PRC’s Mekong policies are explored through domestic anger outlets and expectations 
of rising Chinese power.  The CCP’s security imperative is evident in China’s responses 
to new challenges along its expanding economic frontier, and in a legitimacy requirement 
to demonstrate competency in protecting Chinese lives and interests. 
B. MEKONG CONCLUSIONS 
The case studies on dams and counter-narcotics policies enable conclusions about 
China’s Mekong River behavior.  First, the case studies resonate on different aspects of 
the CCP’s legitimacy; examining which aspects helps explain the domestic drivers of 
China’s policies.  Second, China’s Mekong policies are consistent with broader trends of 
the PRC’s foreign interaction.  Third, examining Chinese policies through a legality lens 
reveals the Party’s prioritization of policy effectiveness—which pathways best secure the 
CCP’s legitimacy—over competing considerations. 
1. Diversity of Mekong Motivations 
Acemoglu and Robinson posit that the combination of political extraction and 
economic inclusion yields an unstable situation that will eventually demand political 
reform to sustain growth.195  This inherent instability is manifested in China as a fragile 
political legitimacy that filters events and conditions to shape state policy.  In China’s 
political bargain, economic progress serves as the most significant counterweight to state 
repression and it, therefore, follows that the CCP’s economic growth imperative 
influences both Mekong hydropower initiatives and counter-narcotics activities. 
However, beyond economic grand strategy, case study evidence reveals that 
China’s Mekong hydropower is heavily influenced by Yunnan Province’s inequality and 
the negative externalities from past development schemes.  From the perspective of 
Chinese elites, the potential of Mekong dams to help address economic growth,  
 
 
                                                 
195 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 92–95. 
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inequality, and social externalities encourages a hydropower policy focused on internal 
sovereignty, opaque in operation, deaf to downstream viewpoints, while unloading 
negative externalities abroad.   
In contrast, the PRC’s recent counter-narcotics efforts grew out of nationalist and 
security imperatives of the CCP’s legitimacy, sparked by new challenges at China’s 
Mekong economic frontier.  China’s interests increasingly span foreign arenas, meaning 
that CCP leaders must now navigate impassioned domestic demands through the 
constraints of the international system while engineering public demonstrations of the 
regime’s nationalist and security credentials.  Since 2011, China’s Mekong counter-
narcotics policies are, therefore, increasingly assertive, projected abroad, and highly-
visible.  The CCP’s political calculations vary across river economic activities, so 
generalizations of an overarching Mekong River strategy—apart from a pro-growth 
economic agenda—are unjustified.  Scholars must examine the specific aspects of 
domestic legitimacy agitation to understand China’s Mekong policies. 
2. Consistent with Trends 
China’s Mekong policies regarding hydropower dams and counter-narcotics 
efforts are generally consistent with broader perceptions of China.  Scholars might 
hypothesize that China’s policies regarding its downstream neighbors would be 
influenced by geographic proximity, shared borders, or historic links.  However, the case 
studies support the argument that China’s Mekong policies mirror the direction—if not 
the intensity—of wider trends observed since 2008 around China’s periphery. 
The PRC’s Mekong behavior supports the contention that the CCP’s “win-win” 
rhetoric is being eclipsed by more assertive policies that trigger increased wariness 
abroad.  The hyper-prioritization of domestic legitimacy imperatives over foreign 
objections regarding Mekong dams is evident in opaque planning, construction, and 
operations processes, and a unilateral transfer of negative externalities to downstream 
countries.  In the counter-narcotics arena, the CCP’s policies appear positive for the 
public good of river security at first inspection.  However, China’s heavy-handed 
tactics—extralegal assertion of jurisdiction, demands for security patrols on foreign 
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territory, fomenting of nationalism to justify policies, proposals for UAV strikes—
undermine counter-narcotics cooperation by redefining success as outcomes that solidify 
the CCP’s domestic legitimacy.  China’s Mekong policies reject possible “win-win” 
pathways in favor of disproportionate gains for the CCP’s political authority. 
The two Mekong case studies also align with the regional trend of increasing 
competition that has yet to generate outright confrontation.  China’s dam policies are 
designed to accelerate hydropower generation for domestic reasons, but China’s actions 
aggravate the “tragedy of the commons” on the Mekong by generating hydropower 
competition with downstream states.  Laos, for instance, has adopted the Chinese model 
of Mekong dam building with surreptitious construction on the Xayaburi and Don 
Sahong dams in attempts to downplay Lower Mekong objections.196  The recent 
approach to Mekong counter-narcotics policy also illustrates regional competition for 
market access.  Chinese businesses own the preponderance of river shipping vessels on 
the Mekong, so river security efforts propel the advancement of Chinese commercial 
interests southward into Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand. 
China’s increasing assertiveness amidst regional competition is also evident in the 
CCP’s selection of institutional pathways for international engagement.  Regarding 
Mekong water use, China has circumvented multilateral regulatory mechanisms—such as 
the Mekong River Commission and the World Commission on Dams—in pursuing a 
mostly unilateral and closed approach to its domestic dam-building programs.  When it 
does engage other Mekong states, China leverages development-minded organizations 
like the GMS that promote hydropower initiatives through grants and loans.  On counter-
narcotics concerns, historic policies exhibited a preference for non-binding agreements 
that facilitated basic information sharing, and bilaterally negotiated memoranda of 
understanding.  Since 2011, however, the success of joint patrols highlights the elevated 
assertiveness of Chinese policymakers over multiple downstream regimes to impose 
policies colored by the PRC’s domestic priorities, rather than voluntary foreign consent 
                                                 
196 Amy Sawitta Lefevre, “Laos Pushes Ahead with Mekong Dam without Consulting Neighbors,” 
Reuters, 3 October 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/03/laos-dam-
idUSL4N0HT1VH20131003. 
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to shared multilateral commitments.  Taken together, the character and volume of 
Chinese interactions with other Mekong states reveals the PRC’s competitiveness in 
pursuit of outsized gains that reinforce the CCP’s domestic legitimacy. 
3. Across the Legality Spectrum: Policy Effectiveness Prioritized 
The selection of Mekong dams and counter-narcotics policies as case studies was 
aimed at determining whether the legality of economic activities shaped the PRC’s policy 
responses.  Dam building embodies massive, domestic, state-orchestrated, legal 
development of natural resources.  The drug trade is a non-traditional and trans-border 
threat fueled by illegal, small-scale entrepreneurs who thrive in regulatory vacuums.  
When viewed through a legality lens, China’s Mekong actions reveal a prioritization of 
policy effectiveness in solidifying the CCP’s legitimacy concerns that displaces 
conventional responses to legal or illicit challenges. 
Around the world, legal dams are usually enmeshed in regulatory framework, 
industrial development practices, environmental impact assessments, and trans-border 
cooperation mechanisms.  On the Mekong River, however, China’s dam-building policies 
are atypical in that the CCP seeks planning opacity and unilateral operations to 
circumvent regulatory mechanisms or downstream objections that might constrain the 
enhancement of the Party’s legitimacy.  To strengthen its political authority, the regime 
pursues asymmetric and informal paths to legal dam construction. 
Conventional counter-narcotics efforts overwhelmingly focus on domestic law 
enforcement measures and token information sharing agreements; the PRC’s policies 
mostly followed this rule until 2011.  However, China’s more assertive counter-narcotics 
policies on the Mekong, by virtue of targeting foreign territory and citizens, actually 
forced dialogue and engagement—however lopsided—with downstream countries.  The 
CCP’s responses against Mekong drug traffickers imposed formal, inter-state cooperation 
against illicit narcotics trafficking along a lawless frontier. 
The counterintuitive pathways of China’s Mekong policies—where hydropower 
development is conducted in the shadows, and counter-narcotics enforcement was forged 
in diplomatic formality—implies that the CCP pursues whichever avenues are conducive 
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to securing the regime’s legitimacy.  Chinese elites value policy effectiveness in securing 
the Party’s legitimacy over more conventional strategies concerning legal and illicit 
Mekong activities. 
C. BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S MEKONG POLICIES 
As this paper’s introductory chapter recounts, academic literature features a lively 
debate on the character of China’s political influence.  In 2005, Joseph Nye noted an 
accelerating “rise in China’s soft power.”197  The following year, Joshua Kurlantzick 
drew on the PRC’s diplomatic “charm offensive” to expect “that China’s rising power, 
and its engagement with the world, will prompt Beijing to wield its soft influence 
responsibly.”198  The PRC’s policies regarding Mekong dams and counter-narcotics 
efforts, however, detract from Nye and Kurlantzick’s predictions and add credibility to 
recent perceptions of a more assertive and confrontational China. 
1. Not So Soft and Charming 
Keohane and Nye define soft power as “the ability to get desired outcomes 
because others want what you want.  It is the ability to achieve goals through attraction 
rather than coercion… or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the 
desired behavior.”199  On China’s Mekong hydropower efforts, the CCP purposely 
maneuvers around the concerns of downstream states and rejects foreign attempts to 
shape Chinese behavior.  The regime preserves its immunity to liberal conceptions of 
policy “attraction,” choosing instead a purposeful deafness to Mekong states’ objections 
to the externalities of upriver dams.  In the counter-narcotics sphere, China’s recent 
actions reflect an imposition of its desires over and above any neighbors’ priorities.  The 
CCP’s modus operandi since 2011 entrenches coercion as its favored tactic to resolve 
crimes perpetrated by foreigners on foreign territory against Chinese riverboat operators, 
in spite of historic norms tied to sovereignty and non-interference. 
                                                 
197 Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power.” 
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199 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” 
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In a similar vein, China’s Mekong actions reveal a departure from a rhetorical 
“charm offensive.”  Kurlantzick describes diplomatic refinement, media outlet 
proliferation, and “networks of informal business and cultural summits… to subtly 
emphasize” China’s openness for partnerships.200  The case study evidence presented in 
this paper argues a different story.  China’s hydropower efforts highlight the 
diminishment of cross-border communication, except where Chinese firms can extract 
disproportionate profits from development contracts.  Moreover, recent counter-narcotics 
activities show “angry” diplomatic demands and summons, a Chinese media fanning 
nationalist flames against foreigners, and less-than-subtle warnings about Chinese UAV 
strike missions.201 
2. The Tyranny of Fragile Legitimacy  
Why the disparity between analysts’ predictions and China’s contemporary 
Mekong policies?  This paper argues that China’s Mekong River policies are less shaped 
by balance of power or interdependence theories, and increasingly driven by the realities 
of the CCP’s legitimacy challenges.  The regime hyper-prioritizes short-term 
contributions to its domestic political legitimacy over the concerns of its neighbors, 
yielding a less-cooperative China that triggers wariness abroad about the scope and 
characters of its ambitions.  The case studies highlight how two Chinese economic 
interests on the Mekong offer the Party a window to, and potential solutions for, its own 
political legitimacy problems. 
The most alarming aspect of the Party’s legitimacy challenges is how sparks of 
nationalism risk foreign policy wildfires.  The CCP’s championing of Chinese 
nationalism to enhance Party legitimacy demonstrates the stored potential energy inherent 
in politically extractive institutions.  More to the point, enflamed nationalism might focus 
unified, domestic outrage and policy demands on foreign policy, escalating relatively 
minor disputes to the level of core interests—those objectives or interests over which 
China will fight.  Most dangerously, over real or perceived affronts to crucial elements of 
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the PRC’s national power—energy security and trade access, for example—Chinese 
nationalism increases the probability of disagreements or misunderstandings to spark 
major conflict.  Consensus-based decision-making among top leadership—where the 
most vociferous elites can drive policy on any given issue—combined with extensive 
PLA power projection capabilities, present the opportunity for nationalism to catalyze 
armed action abroad.  A strong measure of the CCP’s propensity for conflict rests in the 
extent to which the Party can shape and redirect nationalist currents into policies that 
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